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ABSTRACT                                               
In this thesis we construct and analyze a mean-variance utility maximization model 
for a risk-averse electric power generation company who wishes to determine the optimal 
levels of capacity and production from a single conventional fuel source and wind energy 
subject to the state Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS). We assume the conventional fuel 
price and the federal wind power Production Tax Credit (PTC) level are random variables. 
This study is motivated by the highly stochastic nature of the PTC level and the existing 
competing claims for the impact of the RPS on the renewable energy development. 
Throughout our model we show how vastly different arguments and claims for the PTC and 
RPS policy can be accommodated within a single framework. We also analytically and 
numerically show how the RPS level, standard deviations of the fuel price and PTC level and 
their correlation coefficient would affect the generation company’s decisions. Interesting and 
relevant managerial insights and economic implications are presented, as well as policy 
guidelines and recommendations for the PTC and RPS.                                                                               
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 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Due to the increasing public concerns over climate change and air pollution, 
renewable technologies of electricity generation have been promoted all over the world in 
recent years. Sources of renewable electricity generation includes wind, solar, geothermal 
energy etc., among which wind plays a most significant role. By the end of 2009, the 
worldwide wind capacity has reached 159,213 MW, out of which 38,312 MW were added in 
2009 (WWEA, 2010).  
According to EIA’s report of Electric Power Industry 2009 (2010), in the U.S, about 
14,650 MW of wind power capacity has been installed in 2009, which represents 63.3% of 
all the new installed U.S. capacity for that year. The booming development of wind 
generation capacity in U.S. have been accelerated driven by governmental policies and 
subsidies that encourage generation from renewable energy sources. Among the most 
significant incentives of this growth are the federal Production Tax Credit (PTC) and a series 
of state Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS).  
1.1.1 Overview of the Federal PTC 
Established by the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the PTC is designed to stimulate the 
development of renewable energy by providing a production-based credit for the first 10 
years of project options (Wiser et al., 2007). The initial value of the PTC was 1.5 cent per 
kilowatt-hour, which is designed to be adjusted upwards in future years for inflation. Since 
first enacted, the PTC has been renewed or extended on several occasions. Currently the 
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value of PTC for wind is 2.2 cent per kWh, which was extended to the end of 2012. The 
following table summarizes the legislative history of the PTC. 
 
Table 1. Legislative history of the PTC 
 Legislation Date 
enacted 
PTC eligibility 
window 
PTC lapse duration Effective duration 
1 Section 1914, Energy policy 
Act of 1992 
10/24/92 11/01/92-
06/30/99 
N/A 11/01/92-06/30/99 
2 Section 507, Ticket to Work 
and Work Incentives 
Improvement Act of 1999 
12/19/99 07/01/99-
12/21/01 
01/01/00-06/30/00 07/01/99-12/31/99 
07/01/00-12/31/01 
3 Section 603, Job Creation 
and Worker Assistance Act 
03/09/02 01/01/02-
12/31/03 
01/01/02-02/28/02 03/01/02-12/31/03 
4 Section 313, The working 
Families Tax Relief Act 
10/04/04 01/01/04-
12/31/05 
01/01/04-09/30/04 10/01/04-12/31/05 
5 Section 1301, Energy policy 
Act of 2005 
08/08/05 01/01/06-
12/31/07 
N/A 01/01/06-12/31/07 
6 Section 201, Tax relief and 
Health Care Act of 2006 
12/20/06 01/01/08-
12/31/08 
N/A 01/01/08-12/31/08 
7 Section 101&102, The 
energy Improvement and 
Extension Act of 2008 
10/03/08 01/01/09-
12/31/09 
N/A 01/01/09-12/31/09 
8 Section1101&1102, The 
American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 
02/17/09 01/01/10-
12/31/12 
N/A 01/01/10-12/31/12 
 
As one of the biggest drivers of the growth of wind capacity in U.S, the PTC helps to 
reduce the price of wind-generated electricity, which even makes wind power now 
economically attractive in some regions. Its impact on wind generation expansion can also be 
partially observed by the fluctuation of annual installed capacity of wind since the PTC was 
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first enacted in 1992. The annual new installed capacity of wind turbines is showed in the 
following Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Annual new installed capacity of wind turbines in U.S. (1999-2009) 
 
Specifically, the PTC expired in 2000, 2002 and 2004, each time resulting in 
decreases of at least 50% in new installed capacity (DOE, 2006). This historical experience 
indicates that the frequent expiration/extension cycle of PTC might have negative 
consequences for the growth of wind power.  This boom-and-bust cycle might has made the 
PTC less effective in stimulating low-cost wind development for the reason that potential 
investors self-select to avoid investment in wind power due to the uncertainty in PTC.  
Another example of the negative effects of tax incentive expiration can be observed 
in the biodiesel industry in the U.S. The biodiesel production has dropped to almost zero 
since the biodiesel tax credit expired in 2009 (Gelsi, 2010).   
Since the current PTC will be expired by the end of 2012, no one knows what the 
level of it would be for 2013 addition. According to AWEA’s Third Quarter 2010 Market 
Report (2010), U.S. added 395 megawatts (MW) of wind power in the third quarter of 2010, 
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72 percent below this time last year. A higher level PTC with less uncertainty might have 
mitigated this drop.  
1.1.2 Overview of the State RPSs 
In combination with the PTC, state RPS requirements have also emerged as one of 
the most important drivers of renewable energy capacity additions (Wiser and Barbose, 
2008). It requires electric utilities and other retail electric providers to supply a specified 
minimum amount of customer load with electricity (typically as a percentage of total supply) 
from eligible renewable energy sources. The goal of an RPS is to stimulate market and 
technology development so that, ultimately, renewable energy will be economically 
competitive with conventional forms of electric power (EPA, 2009).  
Mandatory RPS policies are backed by various types of compliance enforcement 
mechanisms, and many such policies include the trading of renewable energy certificates 
(RECs) (Wiser and Barbose, 2008). The use of RECs increases compliance flexibility and 
may therefore reduce overall compliance costs. 
Currently 29 states and DC as well as Puerto Rico have adopted the RPS, which is 
illustrated by the following map in Figure 2 (DSIRE, 2010). RPS policies have also been 
developed in several other countries, and have been considered (but not adopted) by the U.S. 
Congress (Chen et al., 2007). 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
Figure 2. Map of current RPS adoptions in U.S. (2010) 
 
Typically, each region adopts an RPS for various objectives, which include ensuring 
an adequate supply of electric power when conventional imported fuel prices are high. This 
mechanism is often viewed as a cost-effective, market-based approach that is 
administratively efficient. According to a technical report from the Berkeley Lab (Chen et 
al., 2007), the long-term rate impacts of state RPS policies are projected to be relatively 
modest in most cases: for most of the studies in their sample the predicted rate increases are 
no greater than 1%. However, some other groups claim that the RPS would increase near 
term electricity costs and might lead to little or no change (Ashton, 2008).  
As mentioned before, U.S. Congress is considering legislation of establishing a 
national RPS, which raised much debate about its potential merits and hazards (Joshua, 
2008). For example, some researchers warn that a national RPS is not practical and might 
lead to blackouts (see Apt et al., 2008).  
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At this point of time, however, it is absolutely unclear if these contradictory 
statements are due to the fundamental differences in their perspectives which manifest in 
vastly different sets of initial assumptions, or in the policy management and operations 
within a single framework of a perspective under the same set of assumptions. 
1.2 Objective 
The objective of this study is to construct an analytical model that concurrently 
address PTC and RPS policy issues within a single framework and accommodate vastly 
different arguments and claims about these issues. Based on the analyses, we will also 
provide managerial insights and economic implications, as well as policy guidelines and 
recommendations that are quite relevant to practitioners and academics. We hope this study 
could help analytically comprehend the roles and examine the effectiveness of the PTC and 
RPS on the generation expansion planning and renewable energy. Here the policy 
effectiveness is defined as a performance assessment, i.e., it judges how the actual effect of 
the policy measure up to its objective (UNEP, 2009). 
We formulate a mathematical model for a risk-averse electric power generation 
company that wishes to determine the optimal levels of capacity and production from a 
conventional power source (e.g., natural gas and coal) as well as wind energy under the RPS 
regulation when the conventional fuel price and wind power PTC are random variables.  
For this study, we utilize mean-variance (MV) utility function to account for the 
generation company’s risk-averse nature. First raised in 1952, the mean-variance portfolio 
theory (MVP) has been developed and widely used in portfolio optimization (Markowitz, 
1952). It optimizes the portfolio’s utility by defining the trade-off between the expected 
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profit (or return) and variance of the profit (or return) (Liu and Wu, 2006). Parametric 
analysis is performed on each of the critical factors, i.e., the RPS minimum requirement, the 
standard deviations of the conventional fuel price and wind power PTC as well as their 
correlation coefficient.  
1.3 Thesis Organization 
The rest of the thesis is organized as following: In Chapter 2 we present a 
comprehensive review of the previous literatures on power generation portfolio optimization 
as well as relative renewable energy policy research. In Chapter 3 we mathematically 
formulate the utility maximization problem for the generation company by employing the 
MVP theory collaborated with the PTC and RPS. Optimality conditions will also be derived. 
In Chapter 4 we conduct parametric analyses on each critical parameter to show how they 
affect the generation company’s decisions.  Chapter 5 provides a numerical example to 
illustrate our insights obtained from the previous chapters. Relevant policy implications are 
discussed and summarized in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7 the preliminary investigation given a 
negative correlation coefficient between the conventional fuel price and wind PTC is 
presented. Conclusion and future work will be provided in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As for the generation expansion planning (GEP), traditional planning has been 
studied for many years. Kagianas et al. (2004) summarizes the traditional modeling 
techniques for GEP under monopoly. Mathematically, to solve a GEP optimization problem 
is equivalent to find a set of optimal decision vectors that minimizes an objective function 
under multiple constraints. Among all the methods that have been used to solving this 
problem computationally, dynamic programming (DP) is one of the most significant and 
widely used algorithms. Other used methods include Bender’s decomposition algorithm, 
linear approximation and Genetic Algorithm, etc.  
In particular, Booth (1972) formulates the long-term generation expansion problem 
by combining a method of production costing based on probabilistic simulation methods with 
an advanced DP problem formulation. The formulated problem can be solved by an “Open 
Loop Feedback” approach which is developed by P. H. Henault. Considering all the system 
states shown to be feasible, this paper also effectively reduces the dimensionality of the 
problem, which allows the rapid calculation of the optimal generation expansion plan.  
On the other hand, due to the transformation from monopoly to competition in the 
electric power market, game theory has also been adopted to formulate GEP problem. 
Chuang et al. (2001) utilizes the Cournot theory of oligopoly to model GEP in a competitive 
electric power industry. In this model, each firm independently decides on its capacity 
reserve participation level, and the generating units are tradable through bidding. Throughout 
numerical experiments it points that the industry expansion and system reliability under 
Cournot competition are greater than those under centralized expansion planning.  
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In recent years, there have been more efforts to exploit relatively sophisticated 
economic models under uncertainty for such planning. As we mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
economic balance between the mean and variance has also been extensively studied in the 
electric power management and operations literature. Wang and Min (2008) formulates an 
electric power portfolio model which aims to maximize the profit while minimize the 
financial risk of the portfolio. It is able to quantify profits and financial risks in a single 
framework which takes account for the risks of forced outages as well as price differentials 
between day-ahead and real-time markets.   
Due to the booming development of renewable energy all over the world, GEP 
including the renewable energy sources has also received much research attention in the 
recent years. Uncertainties in the fuel and electricity price, renewable energy reliability and 
governmental policies have been studied under MV framework in some literature.  
Roques et al. (2008) adopts a MVP model to identify optimal base load generation 
portfolios for large generators in a liberalized electric power market. It uses Monte Carlo 
simulation to generate a series of results of gas, coal, and nuclear plant investment returns as 
inputs. The results turn to show that a high degree of correlation between gas and electricity 
prices reduces gas plant risks and make portfolios dominated by gas plant more attractive. 
Doherty et al. (2006) formulates a cost minimization model which combines with 
wind generation characteristics and generation adequacy. By computationally solving the 
problem and obtaining least-cost generation portfolio results for different wind penetrations, 
they analyze the effect of increasing wind capacity and the role of wind generation in least-
generation portfolio. MVP is also adopted to analyze the fuel-related electricity cost 
volatility. Their results show that for a large range of scenarios, wind generation played a 
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significant role in desirable generation portfolios that are diversified to reduce exposure to 
fuel price risk. 
Awerbuch (2006) is another work utilizing MVP to illustrate how mixed electricity 
generation can benefit from additional shares of wind, geothermal and other renewables.  
They first compare the “least cost” and portfolio-based approaches in generation planning 
and then describe essential portfolio-theory ideas which is used to analyze the effect of fixed-
cost technologies (such as renewables) on the generating mix and its implication for energy 
security. Three portfolio case studies for the EU, U.S. and Mexico are presented to illustrate 
their methodology. In their analysis, they assume the costs of wind, solar and other capital-
intensive renewable are relatively fixed over time and the risk of a generation portfolio 
comes from the fuel and other generating costs. Specifically for the U.S. case, diversity 
analysis is also performed due to the drawback on applying historic cost variance and 
covariance data to the unpredictable future. They finally show that the typical gas-coal 
generation portfolio offers little diversification and provides little insulation from the 
systematic risk of coal and gas price movements. 
Liu and Wu (2006) proposes a sequential approach to optimize electric energy 
allocation for a generation company based on the MVP. They define a risk-penalty factor as 
the term which identifies the company’s degree of risk aversion. This factor could be used in 
the utility function of the tradeoff between the expected profit and risk of the company which 
is called as the “profit approach” instead of the common “return approach”. Based on this, 
the paper develops an analytical and quantitative approach to determine the optimal 
allocation between spot and contract market, with consideration of fuel price, electricity price 
as well as congestion charge. The simulation results shows that a higher correlation between 
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fuel spot price and electricity spot price leads to more electricity traded in the market, which 
is obviously consistent with intuition and thus helpful to such a company to make trading 
decisions. Some other relative study includes Liu and Wu (2007). 
Now we proceed to review the literature on the policy issues of electric power 
generation industry. As the most significant drivers of the renewable energy in U.S., PTC and 
RPS have also been studied in some literature. One of the initial discussions about the 
effectiveness of PTC mechanism is Kahn (1996), which claims that the impact of PTC will 
be minimal because it inadvertently raises financing costs. It focuses on project financing as 
the financing method for developing wind turbines and investigates the capital structure and 
debt based on it. It also suggests the potential benefits of transforming the wind subsidy from 
a tax basis to a cash basis. 
Barradale (2008) points out that the volatility of wind power investment associated 
with the PTC is unrelated to the underlying economics of wind. Instead it is due to the 
dynamics of power purchase agreement (PPA) negotiations which is designated to deal with 
PTC renewal uncertainty. It also suggests and compares some alternative incentives for 
encouraging wind industry, such as depreciation rules, pricing or tariff mechanisms and RPSs 
etc. 
Comparing to the PTC, RPS seems to be more debatable for its rationale. However, 
few studies have been conducted to evaluate its effectiveness and efficiency. Berry and 
Jaccard (2001) discusses the major reasons for the growing popularity of the RPS and raise 
key considerations in designing a RPS, which includes target selection, eligible resources, 
applicability, flexibility mechanisms and administrative responsibilities. It also presents a 
relatively comprehensive summary of the worldwide experience of RPS.  
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Espey (2001) is another paper focusing on the possible impacts of the RPS on 
different market participants in a deregulated market. Based on the theoretical designing 
considerations and practical experiences, it discusses the implication of a RPS on generators, 
utilities, consumers, environmental groups as well as states.  
Palmer and Burtraw (2005) develops a model to compare policies which aim to 
encourage the use of renewable energy. This model, which can predict future generation 
from different sources under different policy options, finds that the RPS raises electricity 
prices, lowers total generation, reduces gas-fired generation, and lowers carbon emissions. It 
also claims that the size of all these effects are grows with the stringency of the RPS. One of 
their case studies also shows that a RPS target between 15% and 20% appears to be proper 
for the year of 2020.  In addition, the RPS appears to be more cost-effective at increasing 
generation from renewable sources than a renewable energy production credit (REPC). 
So far there is few study analytically comprehend the roles of the PTC and RPS in the 
producer’s generation expansion planning concurrently in a single framework. This is also 
the motivation of my research. Through this thesis, the effect of RPS as well as the volatility 
of PTC renewal on a risk-averse electric power generation company will be examined in an 
analytical way by adopting a simplified MV model. Corresponding guidelines and 
recommendations for policy designing will also be obtained based on the analytical results. 
13 
 
CHAPTER 3. MODEL FORMULATION 
In this section, we first formulate the MV utility maximization model for the risk-
averse generation company who wishes to determine the optimal capacity levels from the 
wind energy and a single conventional fuel source subject to the RPS constraint where the 
fuel price and the wind power PTC level are random variables. Next, we derive the 
corresponding solutions that will be utilized in the subsequent parametric analyses. In the rest 
of this thesis we refer to “the risk-averse generation company” as the producer. 
3.1 Fundamental Model Assumptions 
In order for us to focus on the impacts of the RPS when the PTC level is random on 
the producer’s decisions for the capacity levels, we make the following fundamental 
assumptions on the model environment. The purpose of these assumptions is to simplify the 
producer’s decision environment so as to concentrate on the most relevant factors that will 
enable us to construct a tractable and sensible model and its solutions, which will be shown 
to lead to a multiple number of critical and intellectually stimulating policy implications. In 
this way, we also prevent numerous possible secondary factors from rendering the problem-
solving process to be intractable or from unnecessarily obfuscating the critical policy 
implications. 
(1) The model framework is static and the generation planning is on an annual basis 
($/year), which has often been used in the generation planning literature (see Kagiannas et 
al., 2004). Furthermore, except for the aforementioned random variables, all parameters are 
deterministic and, if applicable, linearly proportional. Specifically, the fuel cost function for 
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generation from the conventional source is a linear function of generation quantity, and the 
heat rate is a constant. Also, the annualized capital costs (% for a year) for the conventional 
fuel source power plant and the wind farm are deterministic and static (Chuang, et al., 2001). 
These sorts of static, deterministic, and linearly proportional (if applicable) assumptions have 
been widely used in the generation planning literature (see Doherty et al., 2006). 
(2) The capacity factors, which are the ratio of the actual delivered power to the 
theoretical maximum power (Boccard, 2008), as well as the annual total number of hours of 
generation are fixed for the conventional fuel source power plant as well as the wind farm. 
This implies that the determination of the optimal generation quantity is equivalent to the 
determination of the capacity level. Hence, all implications on one can directly lead to the 
other, and vice versa. 
 (3) For the producer’s decision making process, the per unit electric power selling 
price ($/MWh) will be treated as a static and deterministic parameter for the generation 
planning purposes. With this assumption, we imply that this price is not under the direct 
control of the producer, and the producer can treat it as a given quantity. This assumption is 
applicable to a multiple number of scenarios. For example, there often exist opportunities for 
long term power purchase agreements (PPA) (Ferrey, 2004), and the producer wishes to 
deliberate the capacity levels considering a PPA at a particular price level. Or, for an 
economic feasibility study of a generation portfolio, the producer aims to explore baseline 
capacity levels after supposing a given price level for decision support purposes. 
   (4) The means, standard deviations, and the correlation coefficient of the 
conventional fuel price and wind power PTC level are known to the producer before he/she 
makes the decisions on the capacity levels (but there is no requirement for him/her to know 
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the distributions). Also, the correlation coefficient is positive. This is based on our 
observations as follows. Quantitatively, an annual increase in the PTC level is built in the 
federal PTC legislation according to a cost index (e.g., the inflation rate) (Wiser et al., 2007). 
Qualitatively, a higher conventional fuel price tends to encourage policy makers to take more 
favorable legislative actions on the promotion of the renewable energy (Behrens and Glover, 
2008). 
3.2 Notations 
Here we give the notations we use in the following of thesis. 
pNE      Net earnings after tax of the generation portfolio including the PTC benefit ($/year) 
0
pNE
     
Net earnings before tax of the generation portfolio ($/year) 
0
cNE      Net earnings before tax from the conventional source ($/year) 
0
wNE      Net earnings before tax from the wind energy ($/year) 
R           Risk aversion factor ( 0R > ) 
TPTC    Benefit from the PTC ($/year) 
cx          Generation quantity from the conventional source (MWh/year)
 
wx          Generation quantity level from the wind energy (MWh/year) 
p
         Electricity selling price ($/MWh) 
f
         Conventional fuel price with mean F  and standard deviation Fσ ($/MBtu) 
s
          PTC level with mean S  and standard deviation Sσ ($/MWh) 
FSρ       Correlation coefficient between f
 
and s  
δ          Minimum RPS requirement of the renewable energy over the total energy (%) 
16 
 
h           Heat rate of the conventional power plant (Mbtu/MWh) 
cm         Maintenance cost of the conventional power generation ($/MWh) 
wm         Maintenance cost of the wind power generation ($/MWh) 
cd
         
Annualized capital cost of the conventional power plant (%) 
wd         Annualized capital cost of the wind farm (%) 
cc
         
Cost of installing unit capacity of the conventional power plant ($/MW) 
wc         Cost of installing unit capacity of the wind farm ($/MW) 
ck
       
 Capacity factor of the conventional power generation (%) 
wk         Capacity factor of the wind power generation (%) 
cK
        
Installed capacity of conventional power generation (MW) 
wK
       
Installed capacity of wind power generation (MW) 
τ
          
Corporate income tax rate (%) 
t            Annual total number of generation hours (hour/year) 
3.3 Technical Assumptions 
Before we present the complete derivation of the model and its solutions, three 
technical assumptions are also presented which allow us to focus on the most interesting and 
relevant cases in practice without considering cases that are theoretically pathological and 
irrelevant in practice. 
Assumption 1: At the optimality, the generation quantities cx
 
and wx ,  and the 
corresponding utility level are all positive. 
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Assumption 2: The net earnings from the conventional source are positive and 
sufficiently large, which guarantees that the producer does have a sufficient level of tax 
liability to take full advantage of the PTC in the ranges of random variables being 
considered. 
Assumption 3: The expected value of the sum of the net earnings before tax from the 
wind energy and the benefit from the PTC are positive while the net earnings before tax from 
the wind energy alone can be negative. This is consistent with a critical intent of the PTC. 
Namely, at least on average, one should not expect to lose money even after the benefit from 
the PTC. 
Under these simplifying but critical assumptions, the MV utility maximization model 
will be presented in detail in the next subsection 3.4. 
3.4 Utility Maximization Formulation 
Specifically the general frame of our MV utility function is represented as the 
difference between the expected net earnings of the generation portfolio and the variance of 
the net earnings multiplied by a risk aversion factor as following 
,
1
max E( ) var( )
2c w p px x
NE R NE−                                                                                                 (3.1)                
In (3.1), pNE  designates the net earnings of the generation portfolio consisting of the 
conventional power plant and wind farm including the benefit from the PTC. E( )pNE
 
and  
var( )pNE
 
are the expected value and variance of pNE
 
respectively, and R  is the risk 
aversion factor which indicates the producer’s degree of the risk aversion ( 0R > ), i.e., a 
higher level of R  indicates a higher level of risk aversion  (see Liu and Wu, 2006). 
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Meanwhile, 
c
x
 
and wx
 
are the decision variables indicating the optimal generation quantities 
as we notated before. 
In order to derive the expression of pNE , we first obtain the mathematical expression 
of 0pNE  which consists of two parts: 0cNE  and 0wNE . Hence, the portfolio’s net earnings 
before tax are given by  
0 0 0
p c wNE NE NE= +                                                                                                                 (3.2)
 
Let us now proceed to elaborate on each term of (3.2). The revenue from the 
conventional generation is given by 
c
p x⋅
 
while the fuel and maintenance costs are given by 
c
f h x⋅ ⋅
 
and 
c c
m x⋅
 
respectively. The capacity cost of the conventional power plant is 
expressed as 
c c c
d c K⋅ ⋅ . Hence 0
cNE  can be formulated as 
0 ( )c c c c c cNE p fh m x d c K= − − −                                                                                            (3.3) 
Similarly, 0wNE
 
can be attained as 
0 ( )w w w w w wNE p m x d c K= − −
                                                                                                
(3.4)
 
Therefore pNE
 
can be expressed as 
0(1 )p pNE NE TPTCτ= − +
                                                                                                   
(3.5) 
The first term of (3.5) can be easily obtained from (3.3) and (3.4), and the second 
term of TPTC , which denotes the total benefit from the PTC, is given by 
 
wTPTC sx=
                                                                                                                          
(3.6) 
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We also recall that based on Fundamental Model Assumption 2, the installed capacity 
levels of the conventional power plant and wind farm can be directly expressed in terms of 
c
x
 
and wx
 
by utilizing capacity factors ,
c wk k
 
as well as t . That is 
c
c
c
xK
k t
=
⋅
                                                                                                                             
(3.7) 
w
w
w
xK
k t
=
⋅
                                                                                                                            
(3.8)
 
Utilizing (3.2) through (3.8) we obtain the expression of the net earnings after tax of 
the generation portfolio consisting of the conventional power plant and wind farm including 
the benefit of PTC as
 
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )c wp c c c c w w w w w
c w
x xNE p fh m x d c p m x d c sx
k t k t
τ τ
   
= − − − − + − − − +   
   
                
(3.9)
                    
The coefficients associated with the decision variables 
c
x
 
and wx
 
are simplified as 
follows: Let (1 )( )c c
c
c
d cg p fh m
k t
τ= − − − − , the net earnings after tax per MWh from the 
conventional source. Similarly, let (1 )( )w ww
w
d c
w p m
k t
τ= − − − . We note that w  represents the 
modified net earnings per MWh from the wind energy. If it is positive, i.e.,  
0w ww
w
d cp m
k t
− − > , then w
 
equals to the net earnings after tax per MWh from the wind 
energy . Therefore, it can be arithmetically verified that ( )p c wNE gx w s x= + + , and the 
expected value of pNE  is now given by 
E( ) ( )p c wNE Gx W S x= + +
                                                                                                
(3.10) 
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where E( )G g= , E( )W w w= =   as there is no random variable here, and E( )S s= . It can be 
easily seen that 0W S+ >  based on Technical Assumption 3. 
The corresponding variance term is given by 
2 2 2 2 2 2var( ) (1 ) 2(1 )p F c F S FS c w S wNE h x h x x xτ σ τ σ σ ρ σ= − − − +
               
                                
(3.11)   
or equivalently  
2 2r( 2va ) c wc wpNE x x x xβα γ+= +                                                                                  (3.12) 
where 2 2 2(1 ) Fhα τ σ= − , (1 ) F S FShβ τ σ σ ρ= − −
 
and 2Sγ σ= . 
We note that in (3.12), the first term 2
cxα
 
represents the variance of the net earnings 
after tax from the conventional source, the third term 2wxγ
 
represents the variance of the 
benefit from the PTC, and the second term 2 wcx xβ  is the covariance between the net 
earnings after tax from the conventional source and the benefit of the PTC.    
With both the expected value term and the variance term elaborated, the 
corresponding MV utility function is now given by 
2 21( ) (
2
2 )c w wc w cxU Gx W S x R x x xβ γα += + + − +
                                                              
(3.13) 
With the objective function formulated, we proceed to mathematically characterize 
the RPS constraint. Let δ
 
denote the RPS minimum fraction of the generation quantity from 
the wind energy over the total generation quantity. Then the RPS constraint is 
w
c w
x
x x
δ≥
+
                                                                                                                         
(3.14)
 
where
 
0 1δ< < (i.e., the pathological cases of 0 and 1 are excluded).                                                               
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Under the assumption and derivations presented thus far, a mathematically equivalent 
optimization problem for the risk-averse producer is obtained as follows: 
P1: 
,
2 21min ( )
2
)( 2
c w
c w wc w c
x x
Gx W S x R x x x xβα γ− − + + ++
                                                                          
 
       s.t. 
      
(1 ) 0
c wx xδ δ− − ≤
 
In the next section we will solve P1 analytically and derive the conditions under 
which the RPS binding /non-binding solutions will be optimal.  
3.5 Analytical Solutions 
We note that the optimization problem given by P1 is a quadratic programming 
problem with a linear constraint. As the first step to derive the optimal solutions, the 
corresponding first order necessary conditions (FONC’s) can be attained as follows: 
 First, the Lagrangian function is 
[ ]2 21( ) ( 2 ) (1 )
2c w c c w w c w
L G x W S x R x x x x x xα β γ λ δ δ= − ⋅ − + + + + + − −
                          
(3.15)
 
where λ
 
is the associated multiplier of the RPS constraint. 
The corresponding FONC’s corresponding to (3.15) are
 
0
c w
c
L G R x R x
x
α β δλ∂ = − + + + =
∂
(3.16)                                                                      
( ) (1 ) 0
c w
w
L W S R x R x
x
β γ δ λ∂ = − + + + − − =
∂
                                                                   
(3.17)
                                                            
(1 ) 0
c wx xδ δ− − ≤
                                                                                                              
(3.18) 
0λ ≥
                                                                                                                                  
(3.19)
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[ ]( 1 ) 0w cx xλ δ δ− + + =
                                                                                                     
(3.20)
 
Equation (3.16) and (3.17) characterized a stationary point where L ’s slope is zero, 
(3.18) and (3.19) define the primal and dual feasibility conditions respectively, and (3.20) 
represents the complementary slackness condition.
 
For the second order sufficient conditions (SOSC’s), the Hessian matrix of the 
Lagrangian function is given by 
α β
β γ
 
 
 
, where α , β
 
and γ
 
are defined as before and used 
in (3.12). Hence, the SOSC’s are 0α >
 
and 2 0αγ β− > . 
When 0 1FSρ< < , 2 2 2(1 ) 0Fhα τ σ= − > , and 2 2 2 2 2 2(1 ) (1 ) 0F S FShαγ β τ σ σ ρ− = − − > , 
thus the SOSC’s are met for all feasible values of ( , )
c wx x
 
under our assumptions.  
We first consider the case where (3.18) is binding, i.e., (1 ) 0
c wx xδ δ− − = . The 
corresponding optimal solution and the associated multiplier Bλ
 
are attained by 
2
2 2
(1 ) (1 )( )
(1 ) 2 (1 )  
B
c
G W S
x
R
δ δ δ
δ α δ δ β δ γ
− + − +
=
 − + − + 
                                                                            
(3.21) 
2
2 2
(1 ) ( )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
w
G W S
x
R
δ δ δ
δ α δ δ β δ γ
− + +
=
 − + − + 
                                                                              (3.22)                          
B B
B c wG R x R xα βλ δ
− −
=
                                                                                                    
(3.23)
 
From the non-negativity requirement on λ
 
in (3.19), after substituting B
cx
 
and Bwx  of 
(3.21) and (3.22) into (3.23), we obtain 
[ ] [ ]( ) (1 ) ( ) 0G W S W S Gδ γ β δ α β− + − − + − ≥                                                                (3.24)                                                        
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It can be proved that B
cx
 
and Bwx
 
are both positive given 0G >
 
and 0W S+ >
 
as 
stated in Technical Assumptions 2 and 3. 
On the other hand, if (3.18) is non-binding (i.e., (1 ) 0
c wx xδ δ− − < ) at the optimal 
solution, the corresponding value of NBλ
 
is zero, and the corresponding optimal 
c
x
 
and wx  
are: 
2
( )
( )
NB
c
G W S
x
R
γ β
αγ β
− +
=
−
                                                                                                         (3.25)                         
2
( )
( )
NB
w
W S G
x
R
α β
αγ β
+ −
=
−
                                                                                                        (3.26)                         
Hence, we note that the condition under which ( , ) NB NBc wx x  is optimal is from the RPS 
constraint 
[ ] [ ]) (1 ) ( ) 0G W S W S Gδ γ β δ α β− + − − + − <                                                                 (3.27)                                                                     
We note that (3.24) and (3.27) are both conditions about the critical term
[ ] [ ]( ) (1 ) ( )G W S W S Gδ γ β δ α β− + − − + − . From them we have the following two 
properties: 
Property 1: When B
cx  and Bwx  are given by (3.21) and (3.22), ( , ) B Bc wx x
 
is optimal if 
and only if (3.24) holds. 
Property 2: When
 
NB
cx  and NBwx  are given by (3.25) and (3.26), ( , ) NB NBc wx x  is optimal 
if and only if (3.27) holds. 
Based on the two properties, we summarize the optimal solutions and corresponding 
conditions in the following table. 
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Table 2. Optimal solutions and corresponding conditions for P1 
 Optimal solution Condition 
Binding 
optimal 
2
2 2
(1 ) (1 )( )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
 
B
c
G W S
x
R
δ δ δ
δ α δ δ β δ γ
− + − +
=
 − + − + 
2
2 2
(1 ) ( )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
w
G W S
x
R
δ δ δ
δ α δ δ β δ γ
− + +
=
 − + − + 
 
[ ] [ ]( ) (1 ) ( ) 0G W S W S Gδ γ β δ α β− + − − + − ≥
 
Non-
binding 
optimal 
2
( )
( )
NB
c
G W S
x
R
γ β
αγ β
− +
=
−
 
2
( )
( )
NB
w
W S G
x
R
α β
αγ β
+ −
=
−
 
[ ] [ ]( ) (1 ) ( ) 0G W S W S Gδ γ β δ α β− + − − + − <
 
 
So far we have characterized the optimal solutions and the corresponding conditions 
on the parameters. We now proceed to derive expressions of total generation quantities, 
expected values and variances of pNE , and the corresponding portfolio’s utility levels. 
First we denote the total generation quantities for the binding and non-binding cases 
as Bx
 
and NBx
 
, respectively. They are given by 
2 2
(1 ) ( )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B G W Sx
R
δ δ
δ α δ δ β δ γ
− + +
=
 − + − + 
                                                                              
(3.28) 
                                                                  
2
( ) ( )
( )
NB G W S W S Gx
R
γ β α β
αγ β
− + + + −
=
−
                                                                             
(3.29) 
                         
Substituting the RPS binding solution of (3.21) and (3.22) into (3.10) and (3.12), we 
have the expected value and variance of pNE  for the binding case as follows, 
[ ]2
2 2
(1 ) ( )
E( ) (1 ) 2 (1 )
B
p
G W S
NE
R
δ δ
δ α δ δ β δ γ
− + +
=
 − + − + 
                                                                    
(3.30) 
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[ ]2
2 2 2
(1 ) ( )
var( ) (1 ) 2 (1 )
B
p
G W S
NE
R
δ δ
δ α δ δ β δ γ
− + +
=
 − + − + 
                                                               (3.31)                                                                
Substituting in the RPS non-binding solution of (3.25) and (3.26) into (3.10) and 
(3.12) we have the expected value and variance of pNE  for the non-binding case as follows 
2 2
2
2 ( ) ( )E( ) ( )
NB
p
G G W S W SNE
R
γ β α
αγ β
− + + +
=
−
                                                                   
(3.32) 
                                                                          2 2
2 2
2 ( ) ( )
var( ) ( )
NB
p
G G W S W SNE
R
γ β α
αγ β
− + + +
=
−
                                                                 (3.33)                             
The corresponding MV utility levels for the binding and non-binding cases are 
[ ]2
2 2
(1 ) ( )
2 (1 ) 2 (1 )
B G W SU
R
δ δ
δ α δ δ β δ γ
− + +
=
 − + − + 
                                                                           
(3.34) 
                                                                          2 2
2
2 ( ) ( )
2 ( )
NB G G W S W SU
R
γ β α
αγ β
− + + +
=
−
                                                                            
(3.35) 
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CHAPTER 4. PARAMETRIC ANALYSES 
As mentioned before, local sensitivity analyses are inadequate to investigate the 
competing claims under a single framework. Hence, in this chapter, we will conduct a series 
of parametric analyses on the optimal generation quantities and their corresponding utility 
levels within the entire regions of our interest within the entire regions of our interest with 
respect to the key parameters of the RPS level, standard deviations of the PTC level and the 
conventional fuel price, and their correlation coefficient. 
4.1 Investigation Steps 
For each targeted parameter, the process of investigation is given as follows: 
Step 0. (Initialization) Specify the optimal solution according to the rage of the value 
of the targeted parameter x . For simplicity we denote that for a certain solution (binding or 
non-binding), the lower and upper bounds of the parameter is Lx  and Ux .  We note that Lx  
and Ux
 
could be −∞  and ∞
 
for some certain range where there’s no lower or upper bound. 
Differentiate the objective values in (3.21), (3.22), (3.25), (3.26), (3.28), (3.29), (3.34) 
and (3.35) with x . For simplicity we denote one certain derivative as f
x
∂
∂
.  
It is possible for f
x
∂
∂
 
to have a either quadratic or linear or constant numerator. Since 
it can be proved the denominator will always be positive, we can determine the shape of f
x
∂
∂
 
by examining its numerator denoting by 
n
f .  
1. For the derivatives with quadratic numerator 
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Step 1.1 Solve for the roots on x  which makes 0f
x
∂
=
∂
 (i.e., 0
n
f = ). For simplicity 
we denote the roots as Ar  ( the one with smaller numerator) and Br . 
Step 1.2. Compute A Lr x− , A Ur x− , B Lr x−  and B Ur x−
 
and obtain their signs (i.e., 
negative or positive). 
Step 1.3. Determine the shape of f
x
∂
∂
 
by the results we get from the previous step.  
2. For the derivatives with linear numerator  
Step 2.1. Compute the values of n Lf x x=  and n Uf x x= . 
Step 2.2. Obtain the sign of the two values. 
Step 2.3. Determine the shape of f
x
∂
∂
 
by the results we get from the previous step.  
3. For the derivatives with constant numerator  
Step 3.1. Obtain the sign of 
n
f . 
Step 3.2. Determine the shape of f
x
∂
∂
 
by the results we get from the previous step. 
In the rest of this chapter, the investigation for each of the critical parameters will be 
comprehensively conducted by following the steps we summarize above.  
4.2 Analysis on the RPS Level δ
 
We notice that, when B
cx  and 
B
wx  are given by (3.21) and (3.22), if ( , ) B Bc wx x
 
is the 
optimal solution, (3.24) must hold from Property 1.  By rearranging (3.24) as a lower bound 
on δ
 
we have  
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( )
( ) ( )
W S G
W S G G W S
α βδ
α β γ β
+ −≥
+ − + − +
                                                                                  (4.1)                                                                    
Similarly, when NB
cx  and 
NB
wx  are given by (3.25) and (3.26), if ( , ) NB NBc wx x
 
is the 
optimal solution, (3.27) must hold from Property 2 and can be rearranged as an upper bound 
on δ
 
. That is 
( )
( ) ( )
W S G
W S G G W S
α βδ
α β γ β
+ −
<
+ − + − +
                                                                                  (4.2)                                             
For simplification we denote ( )( ) ( )
W S G
W S G G W S
α βδ
α β γ β
+ −
=
+ − + − +
. The numerator 
and denominator of  δ  are both positive by (3.25) and (3.26), and the denominator must be 
greater than the numerator, thus we have 0 1δ< < . 
Therefore, ( , ) B Bc wx x
 
is optimal when 1δ δ≤ <
 
, while ( , ) NB NBc wx x
 
is optimal when 
0 δ δ< < , as showed in the following table. 
Table 3. Optimality conditions on δ  
δ
 
Binding optimality condition Non-binding optimality condition 
1δ δ≤ <  0 δ δ< <  
( )
( ) ( )
W S G
W S G G W S
α βδ
α β γ β
+ −
=
+ − + − +  
 
Differentiating (3.21), (3.22), (3.25), (3.26), (3.28), (3.29), (3.34) and (3.35) with 
respect to δ , we have 
2 2 2
22 2
2(1 ) 2 (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
c
x G G W S W S
R
δ β δ δ γ δ α δ γ
δ δ α δ δ β δ γ
∂ − − − − + − + − +
=
∂  − + − + 
                                 
(4.3)
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2 2 2
22 2
(1 ) 2 (1 )( ) 2 ( )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
wx G G W S W S
R
δ α δ γ δ δ α δ β
δ δ α δ δ β δ γ
∂ − − + − + + +
=
∂  − + − + 
                                          
(4.4)
 
2
2 2 2
22 2
(1 ) (2 ) (1 )(1 )( )
2 ( ) 2(1 ) ( )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
G G W S
W S G W Sx
R
δ α δ δ γ δ δ α
δ β δ β δ γ
δ δ α δ δ β δ γ
 − − − + + − +
  + + − − − +∂  
=
∂  − + − + 
                                              
(4.5)
 
[ ][ ]
22 2
(1 ) ( ) ((1 ) ) ( )((1 ) )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B G W S G W SU
R
δ δ δ β δγ δ α δβ
δ δ α δ δ β δ γ
− + + − − + + + − +∂
=
∂  − + − + 
                        
(4.6)
 
0
NB NB NB NB
c wx x x U
δ δ δ δ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= = = =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
                                                                                         
(4.7)
 
We note that when 0 δ δ< < , there is no change in the optimal generation quantities 
and corresponding utility level. 
We further note that, when δ δ= , there will be two distinctive slopes at that point of 
δ . In the direction of a decrease, the results will be the same as before. On the other hand, in 
the direction of an increase, the results will be the same as when 1δ δ< < , which is 
summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 If 0FSρ > , 0G > , and 0W S+ >  as implied by Fundamental Model 
Assumption 4, Technical Assumptions 2 and 3, then 
i) 
BU
δ
∂
∂  is negative in ( ,1)δ  
ii) 
B
c
x
δ
∂
∂  is negative in ( ,1)δ  
iii) 
B
wx
δ
∂
∂  is positive-negative in ( ,1)δ  
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iv) 
Bx
δ
∂
∂  is positive-negative in ( ,1)δ  when ( ) 0G W S− + > , and negative in ( ,1)δ  
when ( ) 0G W S− + ≤ .  
See the Appendix for the proof. Statements i) and ii) indicate that when δ
 
exceeds 
the level of δ , the utility level and the generation quantity from the conventional source will 
decrease as δ
 
increases. i.e., after δ , any additional RPS requirement will be perceived 
negatively by the producer, and will affect the generation quantity from the conventional 
source negatively. This implies that one of the stated goals of RPS of “ensuring adequate 
supply of electric power” (see IL Public Act) may be jeopardized given a sufficiently high 
RPS level. 
Statement iii) implies that a higher RPS level does not necessarily encourage more 
generation from the wind energy. Specifically, let us define *wδ  to be the RPS level that 
maximizes the generation quantity from the wind energy and wδ
 
to be the RPS level from 
which the generation quantity from the wind energy starts to decrease relative to the case of 
no RPS ( *w wδ δ<  ). 
Mathematically, for *wδ
 
there exist two explicit expressions. Namely, 
1) when 2( ) 2( ) 0G G W S W Sα γ α β− − + + + ≠
 
2 2
*
( ) 2 ( ) ( )
2( ) 2( )w
G W S G G W S W S
G G W S W S
α α α γ β α
δ
α γ α β
 − + − − + + + 
=
− − + + +
                                           
(4.8) 
2) when 2( ) 2( ) 0G G W S W Sα γ α β− − + + + =
 
*
2 2( )w
G
G W S
δ =
− +
                                                                                                             
(4.9) 
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We note that the difference between these two are arithmetic in nature. That is, 1) is 
from the quadratic form of the derivative and 2) is from the linear form. The general shape of  
B
wx
 
is the same for both cases. 
Mathematically, on the other hand, wδ
 
can be attained by solving B NBw wx x= , for as the 
larger of the two roots (the smaller root is δ ) . Namely, 
[ ]
2( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )w
W S G W S G
W S G G W S
α αβ αβ αγδ
α β γ β α β
+ − − + +
=
+ − + − + −

                                                                
(4.10) 
As δ
 
starts to exceed δ , the producer finds it optimal to increase generation from 
the wind energy and decrease generation from the conventional source to meet the increased 
RPS level. Once δ
 
exceeds *wδ , however, the producer finds it optimal to reduce generation 
from both sources as the more stringent required RPS further reduces his/her ability to 
maximize his/her utility by reducing the size of the region for feasible solutions. As δ
 
starts 
to exceed wδ , the regulatory condition for generation business deteriorates such a degree that 
the generation quantity from the wind energy is even less than that without the RPS.  
Statement iv) indicates there are two possible shapes of 
B
x
δ
∂
∂
 in ( ,1)δ
 
which depend 
on whether ( ) 0G W S− + >  (i.e., the expected net earnings after tax per MWh from the 
conventional source are greater than the expected modified net earnings per MWh from the 
wind energy plus the expected benefit from the PTC per MWh) or ( ) 0G W S− + ≤  .  
The cost of generation from the wind energy varies greatly due to numerous factors 
such as the size of a wind farm, the method of financing etc. (Johnson, 2009). For example, 
in Lazard’s levelized cost of energy analysis (2009), the levelized generation cost from the 
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wind energy (reflecting the PTC) varies from $57 per MWh to $113 per MWh, while the 
generation cost from some conventional source (specifically for a natural-gas combined cycle 
generator) varies from $74 per MWh to $102 per MWh. Hence, a priori, it is unclear whether 
( ) 0G W S− + >
 or not. Therefore, it is necessary to consider both cases. 
When ( ) 0G W S− + > , the total generation quantity will first increase then decrease. 
For such a case, we denote *δ
 
as the δ
 
level maximizing the total generation quantity, δ
 
as 
the δ
 
level from which the total generation quantity starts to decrease relative to the case of 
no RPS ( *δ δ<  ). 
From mathematical steps analogous to those in the analysis of statement iii) we have 
[ ]
2 2
*
( 2 ) ( 2 ) 2 ( ) ( )
( ) ( 2 )
G G G W S W S
G W S
α γ β α γ β γ β α
δ
α γ β
 + − − + − − + + + 
=
− + + −
                          
(4.11) 
[ ]
2 2 22( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( 2 )
G G W S W S W S G G
W S G G W S
αγ βγ αβ β α αβ βδ
α β γ β α β γ
− − + + + + + − +
=
+ − + − + − +

                          
(4.12) 
We note that both *δ  and δ
 
can be shown to be smaller than 1. For the total 
generation quantity, the slope of Bx
 
is positive in *( , )δ δ
 
and negative in *( ,1)δ , and it can 
be further shown that wδ δ< 
 
which indicates that there exists an effective range of RPS, 
( , )δ δ , in which the generation quantity from the wind energy as well as the total generation 
quantity both increase. Hence, if the level of δ
 
is set by the policy maker within such a 
range, such a δ
 
level will be consistent with several critical stated goals of the RPS such as 
“to increase the reliance on renewable energy” (see CA Public Utilities Code), “to ensure 
adequate energy supply” (see IL Public Act), and “to reduce the reliance on imported fuels” 
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(see CT Docket).  This will be an important observation for the policy implications, which 
will be presented in Chapter 6 later. 
When ( ) 0G W S− + ≤ , the total generation quantity will always decrease as δ
 
increases from δ , comparing to the level of non-binding optimal solution. Hence, for 
example, if the expected PTC level is sufficiently high, the RPS goal of ensuring adequate 
supply of electric power may be unattainable. This insight may serve as a warning to any 
state implementing the RPS “mechanically” based on “conventional wisdom”. 
 Figure 3 and Figure 4 below illustrate the impact of δ  parametrically on the 
generation portfolio when ( ) 0G W S− + >
 
and ( ) 0G W S− + ≤ , respectively. 
 
Figure 3. Impact of δ
 
on optimal generation portfolio when ( ) 0G W S− + >  
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Figure 4. Impact of δ
 
on optimal generation portfolio when ( ) 0G W S− + ≤
 
 
4.3 Analysis on the Standard Deviation Sσ
 
Let us now examine the analysis on Sσ , the standard deviation of the PTC level. 
Since (1 ) F S FShβ τ σ σ ρ= − −
 
by definition, let 1 Sβ β σ=
 
where 1 (1 ) 0F FShβ τ σ ρ= − − < . 
Also, we note 2Sγ σ=
 
by definition. Substituting the right hand sides of β
 
and γ
 
into 
conditions (3.24), (3.27) and rearranging them leads us to a lower bound and an upper bound 
on Sσ
 
that are analogous to the ones derived for δ
 
in the previous subsection.  
Hence, ( , ) B Bc wx x
 
is optimal when S Sσ σ≥ , while ( , ) NB NBc wx x
 
is optimal when 
0 S Sσ σ< < , where  
[ ] [ ]2 21 1(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 4 (1 ) ( )
2S
G W S G W S G W S
G
δ δ β δ δ β δ δ α
σ δ
− − − + + − − + + − +
=  
The optimality conditions are summarized in the following table. 
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Table 4. Optimality conditions on Sσ  
Sσ  Binding optimality solution Non-binding optimality condition 
S Sσ σ≥  0 S Sσ σ< <  
[ ] [ ]2 21 1(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 4 (1 ) ( )
2S
G W S G W S G W S
G
δ δ β δ δ β δ δ α
σ δ
− − − + + − − + + − +
=
 
  
Differentiating (3.21), (3.22), (3.25), (3.26), (3.28), (3.29), (3.34) and (3.35) with 
respect to Sσ , we have 
2 2
1
22 2 2
1
2 (1 ) (1 )( ) (1 )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
Sc
S S S
G W Sx
R
δ δ δ δ δ β δ σ
σ δ α δ δ β σ δ σ
   − − + − + − +∂    
=
∂  − + − + 
                                            
(4.13)
                                  2 2
1
22 2 2
1
2 (1 ) ( ) (1 )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
Sw
S S S
G W Sx
R
δ δ δ δ δ β δ σ
σ δ α δ δ β σ δ σ
   − − + + − +∂    
=
∂  − + − + 
                                                   
(4.14)
                                             [ ] 21
22 2 2
1
2 (1 ) ( ) (1 )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
S
S S S
G W Sx
R
δ δ δ δ β δ σ
σ δ α δ δ β σ δ σ
 − − + + − +∂  
=
∂  − + − + 
                                                         
(4.15)
 [ ]2 21
22 2 2
1
(1 ) ( ) (1 )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
S
S S S
G W SU
R
δ δ δ δ β δ σ
σ δ α δ δ β σ δ σ
 − − + + − +∂  
=
∂  − + − +                                                          
(4.16)
 
1
2 2
1
( )
( )
NB
c
S S
x W S
R
β
σ α β σ
∂ +
=
∂ −
                                                                                                         
(4.17) 
1
2 3
1
2( )
( )
NB
w S
S S
x G W S
R
β σ α
σ α β σ
∂ − +
=
∂ −
                                                                                               
(4.18)
 
1 1
2 3
1
( ) 2( )
( )
NB
S
S S
W S G W Sx
R
β β σ α
σ α β σ
+ + − +∂
=
∂ −
                                                                           
(4.19)
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2
1
2 3
1
( ) ( )
( )
NB
S
S S
G W S W SU
R
β σ α
σ α β σ
+ − +∂
=
∂ −
                                                                                 
(4.20) 
Since 1 0β < , it can be easily seen that  , , ,
NB NB NB
c w
S S S
x x x
σ σ σ
∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂
 
and 
NB
S
U
σ
∂
∂
 are all 
negative. This indicates that when 0 S Sσ σ< < , all the generation quantities (total, from the 
conventional source and from the wind energy) as well as the producer’s utility will decrease 
as Sσ
 
increases. This is consistent with the intuitive insight that uncertainty in the PTC level 
will discourage the wind generation. In addition, the same uncertainty, given everything else 
remains the same, will also discourage the generation from the conventional source, and 
reduces the producer’s utility at optimality. 
We further note that, when S Sσ σ= , there will be two distinctive slopes at that point 
of Sσ . In the direction of a decrease, the results will be the same as before. On the other 
hand, in the direction of an increase, the results will be the same as when S Sσ σ> , which is 
summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2 If 0FSρ > , 0G > , and 0W S+ >  as implied by Fundamental Model 
Assumption 4, Technical Assumptions 2 and 3, 
B
c
S
x
σ
∂
∂
, 
B
w
S
x
σ
∂
∂
, 
B
S
x
σ
∂
∂
, and 
B
S
U
σ
∂
∂
 
are negative in 
when S Sσ σ> . 
See Appendix for the proof. With Proposition 2, we note that, whether the optimal 
solution is binding or not, greater uncertainty in the PTC level will always discourage not 
only the generation quantity from the wind energy, but also that from the conventional source 
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as well as the producer’s utility. Figure 5 below illustrates the impact of Sσ  parametrically 
on the generation portfolio. 
 
Figure 5. Impact of Sσ
 
on optimal generation portfolio   
 
We further note that, When Sσ
 
is sufficiently small ( 0≈ ), it can be verified from the 
non-binding optimal solution of (3.25) and (3.26) that  
0 0
0
S S
NB NB
c wx xσ σ
≈ ≈
= < . This implies 
that the producer will prefer generation from the wind energy to that from the conventional 
source. As Sσ
 
increases from 0≈  , the producer finds it optimal to reduce the generation 
quantities from both sources as well as the fraction from the wind energy. Once Sσ
 
exceeds 
Sσ  , the producer will continue to reduce generation from both sources to maximize his/her 
utility with the fraction from the wind energy equaling to the required minimum RPS level. 
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4.4 Analysis on the Standard Deviation Fσ
 
Now we proceed to examine the analysis on Fσ , the standard deviation of the 
conventional fuel price. With an approach that is similar to the one used in the analysis on 
Sσ , we have  
2
1 Fα α σ= , 2 Fβ β σ=   where 2 21 (1 ) 0hα τ= − >  and
 
2 (1 ) 0S FShβ τ σ ρ= − − <   . 
Substituting the right hand sides of α
 
and β  into conditions (3.24), (3.27) and rearranging 
them leads us to an upper bound and an lower bound on Fσ .  
Hence, ( , ) B Bc wx x
 
is optimal when 0 F Fσ σ< ≤ , while ( , ) NB NBc wx x
 
is optimal when 
F Fσ σ> , where  
[ ] [ ]2 22 2 1
1
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 4 (1 ) ( )
2(1 )( )F
G W S G W S G W S
W S
δ δ β δ δ β δ δ α γ
σ δ α
− − + + − − + + − +
=
− +
 
Table 5 below summarizes the optimality conditions. 
 
Table 5. Optimality conditions on Fσ  
Fσ  Binding optimality condition Non-binding optimality condition 
0 F Fσ σ< ≤  F Fσ σ>  
[ ] [ ]2 22 2 1
1
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 4 (1 ) ( )
2(1 )( )F
G W S G W S G W S
W S
δ δ β δ δ β δ δ α γ
σ δ α
− − + + − − + + − +
=
− +  
 
Differentiating (3.21), (3.22), (3.25), (3.26), (3.28), (3.29), (3.34) and (3.35) with 
respect to Fσ
 
, we have 
2 2
1 2
22 2 2
1 2
2 (1 ) (1 )( ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
Fc
F F F
G W Sx
R
δ δ δ δ α σ δ δ β
σ δ α σ δ δ β σ δ γ
   − − + − + − + −∂    
=
∂  − + − + 
                                
(4.21)
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2 2
1 2
22 2 2
1 2
2 (1 ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
Fw
F F F
G W Sx
R
δ δ δ δ α σ δ δ β
σ δ α σ δ δ β σ δ γ
   − − + + − + −∂    
=
∂  − + − + 
                                       
(4.22) 
[ ] 2 1 2
22 2 2
1 2
2 (1 ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
F
F F F
G W Sx
R
δ δ δ α σ δ δ β
σ δ α σ δ δ β σ δ γ
 − − + + − + −∂  
=
∂  − + − + 
                                            
(4.23)
 
[ ]2 2 1 2
22 2 2
1 2
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
F
F F F
G W SU
R
δ δ δ α σ δ δ β
σ δ α σ δ δ β σ δ γ
 − − + + − + −∂  
=
∂  − + − + 
                                            
(4.24) 
2
2 3
1 2
( ) 2
( )
NB
c F
F F
x W S G
R
β σ γ
σ α γ β σ
∂ + −
=
∂ −
                                                                                               
(4.25)
 
2
2 2
1 2( )
NB
w
F F
x G
R
β
σ α γ β σ
∂
=
∂ −
                                                                                                      
(4.26)
 
2 2
2 2
1 2
( ) 2
( )
NB
F
F F
x W S G G
R
β σ γ β
σ α γ β σ
∂ + − +
=
∂ −
                                                                                    
(4.27)
 
2
2
2 3
1 2
( )
( )
NB
F
F F
G W S GU
R
β σ γ
σ α γ β σ
+ −∂
=
∂ −
                                                                                           
(4.28)
 
Since 2 0β < , it is easy to tell , , ,
NB NB NB
c w
F F F
x x x
σ σ σ
∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂
 and 
NB
F
U
σ
∂
∂
 
are all negative. This 
implies that when P1 is non-binding optimal (i.e., Fσ
 
is sufficiently large that F Fσ σ> ), the 
generation quantities from both sources, as well as the producer’s utility, will decrease as Fσ
  
increases. 
We further note that, when F Fσ σ= , there will be two distinctive slopes at that point 
of Fσ . In the direction of an increase, the results will be the same as before. On the other 
hand, in the direction of a decrease, the results will be the same as when 0 F Fσ σ< < , which 
is summarized in the following proposition. 
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Proposition 3 If 0FSρ > , 0G > , and 0W S+ >  as implied by Fundamental Model 
Assumption 4, Technical Assumptions 2 and 3, 
B
c
F
x
σ
∂
∂
, 
B
w
F
x
σ
∂
∂
, 
B
F
x
σ
∂
∂
, and 
B
F
U
σ
∂
∂
 
are positive-
negative when 0 F Fσ σ< < .  
See Appendix for the proof. From Proposition 3, we observe that increasing 
uncertainty in the conventional fuel price does not always discourage generation when it is 
positively correlated with the wind power PTC. Instead, when Fσ  is sufficiently small, an 
increase in Fσ  will actually encourage generation from both sources as well as increase the 
producer’s utility. Figure 6 below illustrates the impact of Fσ
 
parametrically on the 
generation portfolio.  
 
Figure 6. Impact of Fσ
 
on optimal generation portfolio  
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The observation from Proposition 3 contradicts a preliminary intuition that the 
uncertainty in fuel price is a disincentive to electric power generation. Hence, it deserves 
further scrutiny as follows. 
Let us denote *Fσ  as the Fσ
 
level when the generation quantities from both sources 
are maximized. As it can be obtained from Appendix, * 2
1(1 )F
δβ
σ δ α
−
=
−
. When Fσ  increases 
from some level between 0 and *Fσ , the producer finds it optimal to increase both generation 
quantities from both sources. Mathematically, from 2 2 2(1 ) Fhα τ σ= −  in Chapter 3, an 
increase in Fσ  contributes to an increase in 
2 2r( 2va ) c wc wpNE x x x xβα γ+= + . At the same 
time, from (1 ) F S FShβ τ σ σ ρ= − − , an increase in Fσ  contributes to a decrease in var( )pNE . 
Due to these two concurrent effects plus an increase anticipated in the expected net earnings 
of the portfolio, the producer may find the increase in Fσ  as an incentive to produce more 
from both sources when Fσ  is sufficiently small.  
4.5 Analysis on the Correlation Coefficient FSρ
 
In this section we examine the analysis on FSρ , which represents the degree to which 
the movements of the conventional fuel price and the PTC level are associated. Similarly to 
those analyses on Sσ  and Fσ , we have 3 FSβ β ρ=
 
by definition where 
3 (1 ) 0F Shβ τ σ σ= − − < . By substituting the right hand sides of β
 
into conditions (3.24) and 
(3.27) and rearranging them, we can obtain the four explicit sets of optimality conditions as 
below. Namely, 
1) If (1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + <  and 0 1FSρ< < ,  
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( , ) B Bc wx x
 
is optimal when 1FS FSρ ρ≤ <  , while ( , ) NB NBc wx x
 
is optimal when 
0 FS FSρ ρ< < . 
2) If (1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + >  and 0 1FSρ< < , 
( , ) B Bc wx x
 
is optimal when 0 FS FSρ ρ< ≤
 
, while ( , ) NB NBc wx x
 
is optimal when 
1FS FSρ ρ< <  . 
3) If (1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + =
 
and (1 )( ) 0W S Gδ α δ γ− + − ≤ , 
or (1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + <  and 0FSρ ≤ , 
or (1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + >  and 1FSρ ≥ , 
( , ) B Bc wx x
 
is optimal for any 0 1FSρ< < . 
4) If (1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + =  and (1 )( ) 0W S Gδ α δ γ− + − > , 
or (1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + <  and 1FSρ ≥ , 
or (1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + >
 
and 0FSρ ≤ ,  
( , ) NB NBc wx x
 
is optimal for any 0 1FSρ< < . 
where [ ] 3
(1 )( )
(1 ) ( )FS
W S G
G W S
δ α δ γρ δ δ β
− + −
=
− − +
 
for all the conditions above. The four cases above are 
summarized in Table 6 below. 
 
Table 6. Optimality conditions on FSρ  
FSρ  Binding  
optimality condition 
Non-binding  
optimality condition 
(1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + <  
0 1FSρ< <  
1FS FSρ ρ≤ <  0 FS FSρ ρ< <
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(1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + >
 0 1FSρ< <  
0 FS FSρ ρ< ≤
 
 
1FS FSρ ρ< <  
(1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + = ,     
(1 )( ) 0W S Gδ α δ γ− + − ≤  
or (1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + < ,
0FSρ ≤  
or (1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + > ,
1FSρ ≥
 
any 0 1FSρ< <
 
/ 
(1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + = ,     
(1 )( ) 0W S Gδ α δ γ− + − >  
or (1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + < ,
1FSρ ≥  
or (1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + > ,
0FSρ ≤
 
/ any 0 1FSρ< <
 
[ ] 3
(1 )( )
(1 ) ( )FS
W S G
G W S
δ α δ γρ δ δ β
− + −
=
− − +  
 
Substituting β
 
with 3 FSβ ρ
 
into (3.21), (3.22), (3.25), (3.26), (3.28), (3.29), (3.34) 
and (3.35) and differentiating them with respect to FSρ , we have 
2
3
22 2
3
2 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
c
FS FS
G W Sx
R
δ δ δ δ δ β
ρ δ α δ δ β ρ δ γ
 − − − + − +∂  
=
∂  − + − + 
                                                          
(4.29)
    
2
3
22 2
3
2 (1 ) (1 ) ( )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
w
FS FS
G W Sx
R
δ δ δ δ δ β
ρ δ α δ δ β ρ δ γ
 − − − + +∂  
=
∂  − + − + 
                                                                  
(4.30)
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[ ] 3
22 2
3
2 (1 ) (1 ) ( )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
FS FS
G W Sx
R
δ δ δ δ β
ρ δ α δ δ β ρ δ γ
− − − + +∂
=
∂  − + − + 
                                                                  
(4.31)
                                                                         [ ]2 3
22 2
3
(1 ) (1 ) ( )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
FS FS
G W SU
R
δ δ δ δ β
ρ δ α δ δ β ρ δ γ
− − − + +∂
=
∂  − + − + 
                                                                  
(4.32)
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c FS FS
FS FS
x W S G
R
β αγ β ρ γβ ρ
ρ αγ β ρ
∂ − + + +
=
∂ −
                                                                  
(4.33)
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3 3 3
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w FS FS
FS FS
x G W S
R
β αγ β ρ αβ ρ
ρ αγ β ρ
∂ − + + +
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∂ −
                                                                  
(4.34)
 
[ ] [ ]2 2 23 3 3
2 2 2
3
( ) ( ) 2 ( )
( )
NB
FS FS
FS FS
G W S G W Sx
R
β αγ β ρ γ α β ρ
ρ αγ β ρ
− + + + + + +∂
=
∂ −
                                  
(4.35)
 
2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3
2 2 2
3
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
NB
FS FS
FS FS
G W S R G W SU
R
β αγ β ρ γ α β ρ
ρ αγ β ρ
 − + − + + +∂  
=
∂ −
                                   
(4.36)
 
Since 3 0β < , it can be easily see that all the derivatives are positive, implying the 
generation quantities from both sources will increase as FSρ  increases, so does the 
portfolio’s utility. Recall the formulation of the variance of pNE  in (3.11) as 
2 2 2 2 2 2var( ) (1 ) 2(1 )p F c F S FS c w S wNE h x h x x xτ σ τ σ σ ρ σ= − − − + , an increase in FSρ
 
structurally 
reduces the variance when 0FSρ > . This implies that a higher level of correlation between 
the conventional fuel price and the PTC level is preferred by the risk-averse producer, and 
encourages generation from the wind energy. Figure 7 below illustrate the impact of FSρ
 
parametrically on the generation portfolio. 
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Figure 7. Impact of FSρ
 
on optimal generation portfolio 
 
 
For the purpose of encouraging more generation from the wind energy, the current 
policy practiced quantitatively and qualitatively (Fundamental Model Assumption 4) seems 
to make sense. We further note that our analysis here not only provides some quantitative 
support for such a policy, but also shows the exact magnitudes of changes if the policy 
changes with respect to FSρ . 
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CHAPTER 5. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
In this chapter, we provide a numerical example to illustrate the key features of our 
model based on a mixture of empirical and hypothetical data. We recognize the accurate 
characterization of uncertainties is a challenging research problem in itself due to different 
durations of the PTC and special features such as retroactive effective durations (Wiser, 
2007). We also notice that there exist various approaches that can be used to estimate the 
covariance and correlation coefficient between two non-synchronous processes (see Hayashi 
and Yoshida, 2005). Here we assume that the producer’s conventional fuel source is natural 
gas, and the available data on the natural gas prices and the PTC levels are for the one month 
average values of January from 2002 to 2010 (e.g., one could assume that the producer’s 
decisions are to be made in January of 2011).  
 
Table 7. January average natural gas price and PTC, 2002-2010 
Year 
Natural gas price for 
January 
($/Mbtu) 
PTC  
for January 
($/MWh) 
2002 3.1 0 
2003 5.33 18 
2004 6.37 0 
2005 6.72 19 
2006 9.15 19 
2007 7.08 20 
2008 8.52 21 
2009 6.59 21 
2010 6.97 22 
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The monthly average natural gas prices for power sectors in Table 7 are obtained 
from EIA’s summary (EIA, 2010b). For the PTC values, incomplete records could be found 
in some references such as $1.8/MWh in 2003 from EIA (2005) and $2.1/MWh in 2009 from 
Union of Concerned Scientists (2009). The comprehensive data we use are obtained from a 
combination of these published sources and some extrapolations. 
Based on the data in Table 7, expected values, standard deviations, and correlation 
coefficients of the natural gas price and PTC level can be calculated in a straightforward 
manner (Everitt, 2006). The unbiased estimates of standard deviation ( xs ) and correlation 
coefficient ( xyr ) are given by 2
1
1 ( )
1
n
x i
i
s x x
n
=
= −
−
∑  and 1
( )( )
( 1)
n
i ii
xy
x y
x x y y
r
n s s
=
− −
=
−
∑
, 
respectively. 
Table 8 shows the calculated results for both natural gas price and PTC. It can be seen 
that PTC and natural gas price are positively correlated, which is consistent with our 
justification in Chapter 3; the variance of the PTC is much greater than the variance of the 
natural gas price. 
 
Table 8. Expected values, standard deviations and correlation coefficient 
Random variable 
Expected 
value 
Standard 
deviation 
Correlation 
coefficient 
Natural gas price ($/Mbtu) 6.648 1.749 FSρ  0.634 
PTC ($/MWh) 15.556 8.904 
  
 
For the remaining parameter values except the risk aversion factor, Table 9 below 
shows the hypothetical data such as the corporate income tax rate, maintenance and capital 
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costs, capacity factors and annualized capital costs. All the values are estimated or modified 
within a reasonable range from empirical data in EIA’s reports such as Annual Energy 
Outlook 2010 (2010) and Electric Power Industry 2009 (2010). 
 
Table 9. Data for the remaining parameters except risk aversion factor 
Descriptions Values 
Corporate income tax rate (τ ) 35% 
Heat rate of the gas-fired power plant ( h ) 7 Mbtu/MWh 
Maintenance cost of the gas-fired power plant ( cm ) 3 $/MWh 
Maintenance cost of the wind farm( wm ) 2 $/MWh 
Capacity factor of the gas-fired power plant ( ck ) 40% 
Capacity factor of the wind farm ( wk ) 25% 
Annualized capital cost of the gas-fired power plant ( cd ) 5% 
Annualized capital cost of the wind farm ( wd ) 10% 
Cost of installing unit capacity of the gas-fired power plant ( cc ) 900,000 ($/MW) 
Cost of installing unit capacity of the wind farm ( wc ) 1,986,000 ($/MW) 
Number of hours per year ( t ) 8,760 (hours) 
Electricity selling price ( p ) 80 ($/MWh) 
 
Based on the data from we have  
2 2 2
2
(1 ) 63.329
(1 ) 44.924
79.281
F
F S FS
S
h
h
α τ σ
β τ σ σ ρ
γ σ
= − =
= − − = −
= =
 
We also obtained the expected net earnings per MWh after tax from he gas-fired 
power plant and the expected modified net earnings per MWh from the wind farm to be 
11.44G = ($/MWh) 
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8.25W = − ($/MWh) 
Hence we have 7.31W S+ = ($/MWh). We note that in this case, ( ) 0G W S− + > . 
Finally, we assume the risk aversion factor 710R −= . 
5.1 Numerical Solution  
In this subsection we suppose the RPS minimum ratio 0.2δ = , i.e., at least 20% of 
the producer’s generation quantity should come from the wind farm. 
By applying the data to check the optimality conditions (3.24) and (3.27), we find that 
[ ] [ ]( ) (1 ) ( ) 534.741 0G W S W S Gδ γ β δ α β− + − − + − = − <
 
Therefore in this case the non-binding solution is optimal, which can be obtained 
from (3.25) and (3.26) as 
6
2
( ) 4.118 10( )
NB
c c
G W S
x x
R
γ β
αγ β
− +
= = = ×
−
 MWh/year 
6
2
( ) 3.256 10( )
NB
w w
W S G
x x
R
α β
αγ β
+ −
= = = ×
−
 MWh/year 
From these results, the total generation quantity is 67.374 10NBx = × MWh/year and 
the corresponding producer’s utility level is 73.549 10× . We note that the fraction of 
generation from the wind energy is 0.442. Furthermore, it can be verified that the optimal 
capacity of the gas-fired power plant is 1175.228 MW while that of the wind farm is 
1486.758 MW. In this case we observe that a RPS level of 20% is not effective to this 
producer since it doesn’t affect his/her generation portfolio relative to the case of no RPS. 
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5.2 Impact of the RPS Level δ  
In this subsection we illustrate the significant properties of δ
 
according to our 
analysis in the previous section. We have 
( ) 0.442( ) ( )
W S G
W S G G W S
α βδ
α β γ β
+ −
= =
+ − + − +
 
Hence, the non-binding solution is optimal when 0 0.442δ< <
 
and binding solution 
is optimal when 0.442δ ≥ . It can be verified that if 0.45δ = , the optimal solution is  
64.065 10Bc cx x= = ×  MWh/year 
63.326 10Bw wx x= = ×  MWh/year 
Furthermore, we also obtain that 0.585wδ =
 
and 0.466δ = . As δ  increases from the 
threshold of 0.442δ = , the generation quantity from the wind farm will first increase then 
decrease. As δ  increases further from 0.585wδ = , the generation quantity from the wind 
energy will become even smaller than that of the non-binding case. A similar analysis can be 
conducted for the total generation quantity. In this case, the RPS policy will only be effective 
for a level from 0.442 to 0.466, in which the generation quantity from the wind farm and the 
total generation quantity will both increase relative to the case of no RPS. Figure 8 below 
summarizes the observation. 
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Figure 8. Impact of δ
 
in the numerical example 
 
5.3 Impact of Sσ , Fσ  and FSρ  
First we investigate the impact of Sσ
 
and Fσ
 
assuming 0.2δ = . From the 
previously given data, we have 1 5.045β = − , 2 25.685β = −
 
and 1 20.703α = . Hence we have 
the following results: 
For Sσ , the binding solution is optimal when 23.764Sσ ≥ , while the non-binding 
solution is optimal when 0 23.764Sσ< < . 
For Fσ , the binding solution is optimal when 0 0.655Fσ< ≤ , while the non-binding 
solution is optimal when 0.655Fσ > . 
Figure 9 and Figure 10 illustrate the impact of Sσ
 
and Fσ
 
on the optimal generation 
portfolio. We note that, for the Fσ
 
case, the threshold value of * 0.310Fσ =
 
leads to the 
maximum generation quantities from both sources. 
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Figure 9. Impact of Sσ
 
in the numerical example 
 
 
Figure 10. Impact of Fσ
 
in the numerical example 
 
Finally, we investigate the impact of FSρ
 
while keeping other parameters the same. 
From the previously given data, we have 3 70.858β = −
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for any 0 1FSρ< < . Figure 11 illustrates the impact of FSρ  on the optimal generation 
portfolio. 
 
Figure 11. Impact of FSρ
 
in the numerical example 
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CHAPTER 6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Based on our investigation, there are a multiple number of critical policy 
implications. In this chapter, we first review the RPS background and goals in practice. Next, 
we briefly review the corresponding research findings, and provide relevant guidelines and 
recommendations on the RPS policy. We will next review the relevant research findings on 
the standard deviations and the correlation coefficient, and provide further policy 
implications on the RPS as well as the federal PTC mentioned in Introduction. 
Currently, 29 states and DC have adopted the RPS with some variations on targets, 
eligible resources, and administrative responsibilities (DSIRE, 2010). The stated goals of the 
RPS also vary from state to state in directions, scopes, and numbers. Among these goals, 
some of critical goals that are most relevant to our investigation are listed as follows: 
(1) Meet the increasing demands and ensure an adequate supply (see e.g., IL Public 
Act, ME Revised Statue, MI Enrolled Senator Bill and NJ Statue); 
(2) Increase the reliance on eligible renewable energy resources (see e.g. CA Public 
Utilities Code); 
(3) Reduce the reliance on fossil fuels and improve the energy security (see e.g. CT 
Docket); 
(4) Reduce GHG emissions and improve the environment and public health (see e.g. 
CA Public Utilities Code). 
As for the corresponding research findings, we recall from the parametric analysis on 
the RPS that, when ( ) 0G W S− + > , relative to the case of no RPS,  if the goal of the RPS is 
to increase the generation quantity from the wind energy AND the total generation quantity, 
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the RPS level should be in the range of δ δ δ< <  . Under this goal, if δ δ≤ , the RPS is 
ineffective because it has no effect on the producer’s generation decisions. If δ δ≥  , the RPS 
is ineffective because the total generation quantity does not increase. On the other hand, if a 
state’s goal is only to increase the generation quantity from the wind power, then δ
 
should 
be in ( , )wδ δ . Finally, if a state’s goal is to decrease generation from the conventional source 
and reduce emissions, then δ should be strictly greater than δ . 
Meanwhile, when ( ) 0G W S− + ≤ , we recall that the total generation quantity Bx  
decreases as δ
 
increases in ( ,1)δ . This indicates that, relative to the case of no RPS, the 
goal of increasing the generation quantity from the wind energy AND the total generation 
quantity cannot be met with any δ  in ( ,1)δ . On the other hand, if a state’s goal is only to 
increase the generation quantity from the wind energy or to decrease generation from the 
conventional source and reduce emissions, then the ranges of δ
 
remain the same as in the 
case of ( ) 0G W S− + > . 
By comparing the listed goals of the RPS and the corresponding research findings, we 
now present the following policy guidelines and recommendations. 
(a) For states (e.g., Illinois, Maine, Michigan, and New Jersey) with a goal of 
ensuring an adequate supply of electric power and meeting the increasing demands relative to 
the case of no RPS,  
a.1: if ( ) 0G W S− + > , an RPS level where δ δ δ< <    is recommended.  
a.2: if ( ) 0G W S− + ≤ , no RPS level is effective. 
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(b) For states (e.g., California) with a goal of increasing the reliance on eligible 
renewable energy resources relative to the case of no RPS, an RPS level where wδ δ δ< < 
 
is 
recommended. 
(c) For states (e.g., Connecticut) with a goal of decreasing the reliance on fossil fuels 
as well as with a goal of reducing emissions relative to the case of no RPS, an RPS level 
where δ δ>
 
is recommended. 
(d) From (a), (b), and (c), before setting an RPS level, it is recommended for the 
government to correctly estimate the current values of the critical economic parameters as the 
effectiveness of an RPS level is conditional upon a multiple number of critical parameter 
values.  
(e) From (a), (b), and (c), we note that the current format of the implementation via a 
single RPS level is often inadequate. e.g., it may meet some goals, but not others; achieving a 
higher level of a goal may mean achieving a lower level of another goal concurrently. Hence, 
it is recommended that the government explore more sophisticated RPS mechanisms as a 
single PRS level may seem “primitive” and “blunt.” 
Let us now proceed to review the relevant findings and recommendations with respect 
to the standard deviations and the correlation coefficient as follows. First, we recall from the 
parametric analysis on Sσ
 
that, under the RPS, a lower degree of uncertainty in the wind 
PTC level will increase the generation quantities from both the conventional source and wind 
energy whether the solution is binding or not. This implies that, by reducing the uncertainty 
in the PTC level (e.g., make the PTC level more transparent and predictable according to the 
producer’s perception), the federal government could encourage the achievement of the goals 
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(1) and (2) of the RPS, but at the same time, the achievement of the goals (3) and (4) will 
become more difficult. 
Next, we recall from the parametric analysis on Fσ
 
that, under the RPS, when the 
solution is binding, a higher degree of uncertainty in the conventional fuel price does not 
necessarily discourage generation from any source (a higher degree of uncertainty within the 
range of *(0, )Fσ  will encourage generation quantities from both the conventional source and 
wind energy). When Fσ
 
is sufficiently large ( *F Fσ σ> ), the generation quantities from the 
conventional source and wind energy decease whether the solution is binding or not. This 
will facilitate the achievement of the goals (3) and (4) of the RPS, but at the same time, this 
will discourage the achievement of the goal (1) and (2). 
Finally, we recall from the parametric analysis on FSρ  that, under the RPS, a higher 
level of correlation between the conventional fuel price and wind PTC level will encourage 
generation from both the conventional source and wind energy whether the solution is 
binding or not. Hence by strengthening the correlation between the conventional fuel price 
and wind PTC level (e.g., make this subsidy level even higher when the conventional fuel 
price increases), the federal government could encourage the achievement of the goal (1) and 
(2) of the RPS, but, at the same time, could discourage the achievement of the goals (3) and 
(4). 
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CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION OF NEGATIVE CORRELATION 
In Chapter 3, it is presumed that the correlation coefficient between the conventional 
fuel price and the wind power PTC level is positive (see Fundamental Model Assumption 4). 
This presumption is justified based on our observation from both quantitative and qualitative 
aspects, as we elaborated before. One the other hand, however, we also recognize that, in the 
future, the uncertainty in the PTC level might also bring negative correlation between it and 
the fuel price. Therefore, it is also worthwhile for us to examine the model under the negative 
FSρ , which will also bring some interesting and relevant managerial insights. 
We note that Technical Assumptions 1 through 3 still hold when 0FSρ < . Hence, it is 
easy to obtain that the optimal solutions and corresponding conditions on each parameter 
(except FSρ  itself) are the same as those for the case of 0FSρ >  (see Table 2 through Table 
4).  
Due to the mathematical structure of our model, to conducting comprehensive 
parametric analyses under negative FSρ  are much more difficult (especially for δ  and FSρ ) 
and are still IN PROGRESS. In this chapter we aim to briefly discuss the results we obtained 
from the initial investigation and illustrate their relevant policy implications. 
7.1 Results from the Preliminary Parametric Analyses 
In this section we present the results we obtained from the preliminary parametric 
analyses on the RPS level δ , standard deviations Sσ  and Fσ , and correlation coefficient 
FSρ . We note that the comprehensive analyses are still in progress. 
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7.1.1 Result of the RPS Level δ  
Given 0FSρ < , we are able to obtain the following  possible cases of the shapes of 
the optimal generation quantities from the conventional fuel source and the wind energy as 
well as the total generation quantity, i.e., B
cx , 
B
wx , 
Bx , NBcx , 
NB
wx , and 
NBx . We note that 
when δ δ= , there will be two distinctive slopes for each target at that point of δ . In the 
direction of a decrease, the results will be the same as 0 δ δ< < . On the other hand, in the 
direction of an increase, the results will be the same as when 1δ δ< < . 
(a) For the optimal generation quantity from the conventional fuel source, when 
1δ δ< < , there are two possible cases. Namely, 
a.1: 
B
c
x
δ
∂
∂
 is positive-negative in ( ,1)δ . 
a.2: 
B
c
x
δ
∂
∂
 is negative in ( ,1)δ . 
When the P1 is non-binding optimal (i.e., 0 δ δ< < ), it is easy to verify from (3.25) 
that 0
NB
c
x
δ
∂
=
∂ . 
(b) For the optimal generation quantity from the wind energy, when 1δ δ< < , there 
are also two possible cases. Namely, 
b.1: 
B
wx
δ
∂
∂
 is positive-negative in ( ,1)δ . 
b.2: 
B
wx
δ
∂
∂
 is positive in ( ,1)δ . 
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When the P1 is non-binding optimal (i.e., 0 δ δ< < ), it is easy to verify from (3.26) 
that 0
NB
wx
δ
∂
=
∂ . 
 (c) For the optimal total generation quantity, when 1δ δ< < , there are three possible 
cases. Namely, 
c.1: 
B
x
δ
∂
∂
 is positive-negative. 
c.2: 
B
x
δ
∂
∂
 is negative. 
c.3: 
B
x
δ
∂
∂
 is positive. 
When the P1 is non-binding optimal (i.e., 0 δ δ< < ), it is easy to verify from (3.29) 
that 0
NBx
δ
∂
=
∂ . 
Due to the mathematical structure, to specify the corresponding conditions for each 
case is difficult. Here we use Figure 12 and Figure 13 from our numerical simulation to 
briefly illustrate two typical patterns which will provide us more managerial insights. Figure 
12 shows under certain conditions, the generation quantity from the wind energy and the total 
generation quantity are always increasing, while that from the conventional source is 
decreasing when the RPS level increases from the threshold of δ .  
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Figure 12. Possible case 1 of δ
 
on optimal generation portfolio given 0FSρ <  
 
 
Figure 13. Possible case 2 of δ
 
on optimal generation portfolio given 0FSρ <  
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Figure 13 provides another interesting case that the generation quantity from the wind 
energy is increasing, while that from the conventional source and the total generation 
quantity are both decreasing when the RPS level increases from the threshold of δ . 
7.1.2 Result of the Standard Deviation Sσ  
Given 0FSρ < , we are able to obtain the following  possible cases of the shapes of  
B
cx , 
B
wx , 
Bx , NBcx , 
NB
wx , and 
NBx . We note that when S Sσ σ= , there will be two distinctive 
slopes at that point of Sσ . In the direction of a decrease, the results will be the same as 
0 S Sσ σ< < . On the other hand, in the direction of an increase, the results will be the same as 
when S Sσ σ> . 
(a) For the optimal generation quantity from the conventional fuel source, when 
S Sσ σ> , 
B
c
S
x
σ
∂
∂
 is negative. When P1 is non-binding optimal (i.e., 0 S Sσ σ< < ), 
NB
c
S
x
σ
∂
∂
 is 
positive. 
(b) For the optimal generation quantity from the wind energy, when S Sσ σ> , 
B
w
S
x
σ
∂
∂
 is 
negative. When P1 is non-binding optimal (i.e., 0 S Sσ σ< < ), 
NB
c
S
x
σ
∂
∂
 is also negative. 
(c) For the optimal total generation quantity, when S Sσ σ> , 
B
S
x
σ
∂
∂
 is negative. When 
P1 is non-binding optimal (i.e., 0 S Sσ σ< < ), there are three possible cases. Namely, 
c.1: If 1
1
( ) 2( )0 S
W S W S
G
β α
σβ
− + + +
< < ,  
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NB
S
x
σ
∂
∂
 
is negative when 1
1
( ) 2( )0 S
W S W S
G
β α
σ β
− + + +
< ≤ ; 
NB
S
x
σ
∂
∂
 
is positive when 1
1
( ) 2( )
S S
W S W S
G
β α
σ σβ
− + + +
< < . 
c.2: If 1
1
( ) 2( )
S
W S W S
G
β α
σβ
− + + + ≥ , 
NB
S
x
σ
∂
∂
 is negative. 
c.3: If 1
1
( ) 2( ) 0W S W S
G
β α
β
− + + + ≤ , 
NB
S
x
σ
∂
∂
 is positive. 
These three cases of 
NB
S
x
σ
∂
∂
indicate that when the uncertainty of the PTC level is 
sufficiently small within the range of non-binding optimality, the effect of its increment on 
the total generation quantity may vary under a negative FSρ . Here we use Figure 14 from our 
numerical simulation to briefly illustrate the one of the typical pattern. 
 
Figure 14. Possible case of Sσ
 
on optimal generation portfolio given 0FSρ <  
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From Figure 14, we note that given 0FSρ < , when Sσ
 
is sufficiently small (i.e., 
0 S Sσ σ< < ), an increment in Sσ
 
will encourage the generation from the conventional 
source, which is different from the conclusion we obtained before for the case of positive 
FSρ . 
7.1.3 Result of the Standard Deviation Fσ  
Given 0FSρ < , we are able to obtain the following  possible cases of the shapes of  
B
cx , 
B
wx , 
Bx , NBcx , 
NB
wx , and 
NBx . We note that when F Fσ σ= , there will be two distinctive 
slopes at that point of Fσ . In the direction of an increase, the results will be the same as 
F Fσ σ> . On the other hand, in the direction of a decrease, the results will be the same as 
when 0 F Fσ σ< < . 
(a) For the optimal generation quantity from the conventional source, when 
0 F Fσ σ< < , 
B
c
F
x
σ
∂
∂
 is negative. When P1 is non-binding optimal (i.e., F Fσ σ> ), 
NB
c
F
x
σ
∂
∂
 is 
also negative. 
(b) For the optimal generation quantity from the wind energy, when 0 F Fσ σ< < , 
B
w
F
x
σ
∂
∂
 is negative. When P1 is non-binding optimal (i.e., F Fσ σ> ), 
NB
w
F
x
σ
∂
∂
 is positive. 
(c) For the optimal total generation quantity, when 0 F Fσ σ< < , 
B
F
x
σ
∂
∂
 is negative. 
When P1 is non-binding optimal (i.e., F Fσ σ> ), there are two possible cases. Namely, 
c.1: If 2
2
2
( ) F
G G
W S
γ β
σβ
− ≤
+
, 
NB
F
x
σ
∂
∂
 
is positive. 
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c.2: If 2
2
2
( ) F
G G
W S
γ β
σβ
−
>
+
,  
NB
F
x
σ
∂
∂
 is negative when 2
2
2
( )F F
G G
W S
γ β
σ σ β
−
< ≤
+
; 
NB
F
x
σ
∂
∂
 is positive when 2
2
2
( )F
G G
W S
γ β
σ β
−
>
+
. 
These two cases of 
NB
F
x
σ
∂
∂
indicates that when the uncertainty of the fuel price is 
sufficiently large within the range of non-binding optimality, the effect of its increment on 
the total generation quantity may vary. Figure 15 below illustrates one of the typical patterns.  
 
Figure 15. Possible case of Fσ
 
on optimal generation portfolio given 0FSρ <
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From Figure 15, we note that given 0FSρ < , when Fσ
 
is sufficiently large (i.e., 
F Fσ σ> ),  an increment in Fσ  will encourage the generation from the wind energy, which is 
different from the conclusion we obtained before for the case of positive FSρ . 
7.1.4 Result of the Correlation Coefficient FSρ  
Given 0FSρ < , first we have to re-derive the optimal solutions and corresponding 
conditions on FSρ . The derived approach is similar to what we did to for the case of positive 
FSρ  in Section 4.5. The result is summarized in the following table.  
  
Table 10. Optimal conditions on FSρ
 
given 0FSρ <  
FSρ  Binding  
optimality condition 
Non-binding  
optimality condition 
(1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + <  
1 0FSρ− < <  
0FS FSρ ρ≤ <  1 FS FSρ ρ− < <
 
 
(1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + >
 1 0FSρ− < <  
1 FS FSρ ρ− < ≤
 
 
0FS FSρ ρ< <  
(1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + = ,     
(1 )( ) 0W S Gδ α δ γ− + − ≤  
or (1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + < ,
1FSρ ≤ −  
or (1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + > ,
0FSρ ≥
 
any 1 0FSρ− < <
 
/ 
(1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + = ,     
(1 )( ) 0W S Gδ α δ γ− + − >  
/ any 1 0FSρ− < <
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or (1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + < ,
0FSρ ≥  
or (1 ) ( ) 0G W Sδ δ− − + > ,
1FSρ ≤ −
 
[ ] 3
(1 )( )
(1 ) ( )FS
W S G
G W S
δ α δ γρ δ δ β
− + −
=
− − +  
 
Now we are able to obtain the following possible cases of the shapes of  B
cx , 
B
wx , 
Bx , 
NB
cx , 
NB
wx , and 
NBx . We note that for those conditions where FSρ  is applicable there will be 
two distinctive slopes at that point of FSρ , which equals to the value when 0FS FSρ ρ≤ <  and 
1 FS FSρ ρ− < < . 
(a) For the optimal generation quantity from the conventional source, when P1 is 
binding optimal, 
B
c
FS
x
ρ
∂
∂
 is positive. When it is non-binding optimal, there are two possible 
cases. Namely, 
a.1: 
NB
c
FS
x
ρ
∂
∂
 is positive. 
a.2: 
NB
c
FS
x
ρ
∂
∂
 is negative-positive. 
(b) For the optimal generation quantity from the wind energy, when P1 is binding 
optimal, 
B
w
FS
x
ρ
∂
∂
 is positive. When it is non-binding optimal, there are also two possible cases. 
Namely, 
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b.1: 
NB
w
FS
x
ρ
∂
∂
 is positive. 
b.2: 
NB
w
FS
x
ρ
∂
∂
 is negative-positive. 
(c) For the optimal total generation quantity, when P1 is binding optimal, 
B
FS
x
ρ
∂
∂
 is 
positive. When it is non-binding optimal, there are also two possible cases. Namely, 
c.1: 
NB
FS
x
ρ
∂
∂
 is positive. 
c.2: 
NB
FS
x
ρ
∂
∂
 is negative-positive. 
Due to the mathematical structure, to specify the corresponding conditions for each 
case is difficult. Here we use Figure 16 below from our numerical simulation to briefly 
illustrate one of the typical patterns which will provide us more managerial insights. 
 
Figure 16. Possible case of FSρ
 
on optimal generation portfolio given 0FSρ <  
-1 0
Correlation coefficient
O
u
tp
u
t l
ev
el
 
(M
W
h/
ye
ar
)
Non-binding optimal
Conventional
Wind
Total
69 
 
 
From Figure 16, we note that, given 0FSρ < , a higher level of FSρ  does not 
necessarily increase the generation quantity from the wind energy, which is different from 
the conclusion we obtained for the case of positive FSρ . 
7.2 Preliminary Policy Implications 
Based on the results of preliminary analyses, we briefly summarize the policy 
implications when 0FSρ < .  
First of all, recall Figure 12, a higher level of the RPS can always encourage the 
generation from the wind energy and the total generation, while discourage the generation 
from the conventional source. This implies that in this particular case, a single scalar of the 
RPS in ( ,1)δ  is sufficient to meet all the goals listed in Chapter 6; the higher δ  is, the better 
that the goals could be met. However, this is not always true. For example, Figure 13 shows 
that under some circumstance, current format of the implementation via a single RPS level is 
inadequate: it may meet some goals, but not others; achieving a higher level of a goal may 
mean achieving a lower level of another goal concurrently.  
Second, we recall from the analysis of Sσ  in 7.1.2 that, under the RPS, when the 
optimal solution is non-binding, a lower degree of uncertainty in the PTC level always 
increases the generation quantity from the wind energy, but does not necessarily increase that 
from the conventional source and the total generation quantity. This implies that, when 
0FSρ < , the federal government might be able to encourage the achievement of all the goals 
of the RPS at the same time by reducing the uncertainty in the PTC level. 
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Third, we recall from the analysis on Fσ
 
in 7.1.3 that, under the RPS, when the 
optimal solution is non-binding, a higher degree of uncertainty in fuel price always 
discourages the generation from the conventional source, but does not necessarily discourage 
that from the wind energy and the total generation. This implies that, when 0FSρ < , 
increasing the uncertainty level of the fuel price might facilitate the achievement of all the 
goals of the RPS. 
Finally, we recall from the analysis on FSρ  in 7.1.4 that, under the RPS, when the 
optimal solution is non-binding, a higher level of correlation between the conventional fuel 
price and wind PTC level does not necessarily encourage the generation from both source. 
Instead, a higher level of FSρ
 
might decrease the generation quantity of some source or the 
total generation quantity. Hence, strengthening the correlation between the conventional fuel 
price and wind PTC level is not always a good way to encourage the wind energy 
development.  
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis we formulated and analyzed a mean-variance utility maximization 
model for a risk-averse electric power generation company who wishes to determine the 
optimal levels of capacity and generation for a single conventional source and the wind 
energy under RPS regulation where the conventional fuel price and wind power PTC level 
are random variables. This study is motivated by a strong desire to reconcile competing 
claims for the roles of the RPS on generation expansion planning and the stochastic nature of 
the PTC level. 
Throughout our intensive parametric analyses, we were able to obtain a multiple 
number of relevant and interesting managerial insights and economic implications when the 
conventional fuel price and wind power PTC are positively correlated (which is justified and 
consistent with our observation). For example, we showed that a higher level of the RPS does 
not necessarily encourage generation (or capacity expansion) from the wind energy relative 
to the case of no RPS. Under certain circumstances, the need to introduce the RPS is reduced. 
This also indicates that given a single level of RPS, it is possible to help achieve some goals 
and go against some other goals. Hence, some refinement in RPS may be necessary. We also 
find an “effective range” of the RPS level that will increase the generation quantity from the 
wind energy and the total generation quantity while decrease the generation quantity from the 
conventional source at the same time. 
Second, we showed that a lower degree of uncertainty in the wind power PTC level 
will increase the generation quantities (or capacity levels) from both the conventional source 
and the wind energy. This is intuitively consistent with the producer’s risk-averse nature. 
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Third, we revealed an interesting fact that a higher degree of uncertainty in the 
conventional fuel price does not necessarily discourage generation (or capacity expansion) 
from any source.  Instead, within a certain range, a bigger Fσ
 
leads to a higher level of 
generation (or capacity expansion) from both sources. This conclusion opposes the common 
statement that increasing uncertainty in the conventional fuel price discourages electricity 
generation.  
Forth, we showed a higher level of correlation between the conventional fuel price 
and wind PTC level will encourage generation quantities from both the conventional source 
and wind energy.  
Finally, based on all the findings, a list of policy guidelines and recommendations 
was presented which could be used to improve the effectiveness of the RPS and wind power 
PTC corresponding to their stated goals. 
In addition, we also realized the worth of conducting similar analyses when the fuel 
price and wind power PTC are negatively correlated. Through our preliminary analyses we 
were also able to provide some valuable results as well as policy implications. 
While it is still too early to fully assess the effectiveness of RPS adopted by states, the 
formulation and analyses in this paper can serve as a basis for numerous future studies. Based 
on the model, the effect of the PTC could be understood better if we investigate the case 
when the uncertainty in the PTC is approaching zero. Moreover, as specifically mentioned in 
Chapter 3, some simplifying assumptions can be relaxed. For example, what if the electricity 
selling price is also a random variable? More random variable will bring in a more 
complicated variance structure, with more correlation terms. Such a relaxation effort will 
widen the applicability of our model. Another example would be to introduce more 
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generating candidates and physical constraints, which develops our model into a large-scale 
GEP problem. Advanced algorithms might be needed to solve this kind of problem 
efficiently from a numerical perspective. Dynamic modeling methods such as Binomial 
Lattice, Geometric Brownian Motion also need to be explored. In addition, as more and 
better sets of data become available on the PTC and RPS, a fully empirical study (cf. an 
analytical study with a numerical example) on generation expansion planning seems to be 
worthwhile. 
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APPENDIX 
Here we briefly give the outlines of verification of Proposition 1, 2 and 3 in Chapter 
4. 
A.1 Verification of Proposition 1 
By rewriting the binding optimality condition (3.24) it is easy to get the first 
statement proved, i.e., 0
BU
δ
∂ ≤
∂
. 
For 
B
c
x
δ
∂
∂
 , by following the investigation process we present in Chapter 4 we have  
the two roots when 2 2 ( ) ( ) 0G G W S W Sβ γ α γ− + + + − + ≠
 
as 
[ ] [ ]2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 ( ) ( )
G G W S G G W S W S W S G
G G W S W S
β γ α γ γ β γ α β
β γ α γ
− + + + ± − + + + + −
− + + + − +
 
For simplification we denote the two roots as 1r
 
(with smaller numerator) and 2r . 
In order to grasp the derivative’s property, we follow the steps summarized in the 
beginning of this section and compare both 1r
 
and 2r
 
with the boundary of binding optimal, 
i.e., δ
 
and 1. 
[ ] 2 2
1
( ) 2 ( ) ( )
1
2 2 ( ) ( )
G W S G G W S W S
r
G G W S W S
γ γ γ β α
β γ α γ
 − − + − − + + + 
− =
− + + + − +
 
[ ] 2 2
2
( ) 2 ( ) ( )
1
2 2 ( ) ( )
G W S G G W S W S
r
G G W S W S
γ γ γ β α
β γ α γ
 − − + + − + + + 
− =
− + + + − +
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[ ]
[ ]
2 2
2 2
1
( ) 2 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( )
( 2 2 ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( )
G G W S W S
W S G G W S G G W S W S
r
G G W S W S W S G G W S
γ β γ β α
α β γ β γ γ β α
δ β γ α γ α β γ β
  − − + + +  
  − + − + − + × − + + +  
− =
− + + + − + + − + − +
 
[ ]
[ ]
2 2
2 2
2
( ) 2 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( )
( 2 2 ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( )
G G W S W S
W S G G W S G G W S W S
r
G G W S W S W S G G W S
γ β γ β α
α β γ β γ γ β α
δ β γ α γ α β γ β
  − − + + +  
  + + − + − + × − + + +  
− =
− + + + − + + − + − +
 
For 1r
 
there are five cases: 1 1r > , 1 1r = , 1 1rδ < < , 1r δ= , 1r δ< ; 
For 2r
 
there are five cases: 2 1r > , 2 1r = , 2 1rδ < < , 2r δ= , 2r δ< . 
Thus we have 5*5=25 cases of 1r
 
and 2r . The proof of the statement ii in Proposition 
1 can be obtained through proving the following three lemmas. 
Lemma 1 If 0FSρ > , 0G > , and 0W S+ >  as implied by Fundamental Model 
Assumption 4, Technical Assumptions 2 and 3, then 
B
c
x
δ
∂
∂
 is negative in ( ,1)δ
 
when 
2 2 ( ) ( ) 0G G W S W Sβ γ α γ− + + + − + > .  
We show the proof outlines as follows: 
When 2 2 ( ) ( ) 0G G W S W Sβ γ α γ− + + + − + > , 1 2r r< . 
The condition for 2 1 0r − >
 
to hold is
[ ]2 22 ( ) ( ) ( )G G W S W S G W Sγ γ β α γ − + + + > − +   
a. when ( ) 0G W S− + ≤ , it always holds; 
b. when ( ) 0G W S− + > , squaring both sides we have 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ( )G G W S W S G W S G W Sγ βγ αγ γ γ γ− + + + > + + − +
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After simplifying we have 
[ ]( ) 2 2 ( ) ( ) 0W S G G W S W Sγ β γ α γ+ − + + + − + >  
Since 0W S+ > , 0γ > , we have 2 2 ( ) ( ) 0G G W S W Sβ γ α γ− + + + − + > . 
Therefore when 2 2 ( ) ( ) 0G G W S W Sβ γ α γ− + + + − + > , the inequality will always 
hold, i.e., 2 1 0r − > . 
Similarly, we consider the condition for 1 0r δ− >
 
to hold is 
[ ]
2 2
2 2
( ) 2 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( )
G G W S W S
W S G G W S G G W S W S
γ β γ β α
α β γ β γ γ β α
 − − + + + 
 > + − + − + × − + + + 
 
Since 0γ β− > , dividing both sides by 2 22 ( ) ( )G G W S W Sγ βγ α− + + +
 
we have 
[ ]2 2( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )G G W S W S W S G G W Sγ β γ β α α β γ β γ− − + + + > + − + − +  
Squaring both sides we have 
[ ]22 2 2( ) 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )G G W S W S W S G G W Sγ β γ β α α β γ β γ − − + + + > + − + − +   
After simplifying we have 
[ ]2( )( ) ( ) 2 2 ( ) 0W S W S G G W Sαγ β γ γ β α− + + − + − + >
 
Since 2αγ β− , 0W S+ > , we have ( ) 2 2 ( ) 0W S G G W Sγ γ β α+ − + − + >
 
which 
contradicts to 2 2 ( ) ( ) 0G G W S W Sβ γ α γ− + + + − + > .  
Therefore when 2 2 ( ) ( ) 0G G W S W Sβ γ α γ− + + + − + > , the inequality will never 
hold, i.e., 1 0r δ− < . 
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Summarizing what we obtained we have the conclusion that given 0FSρ > , when 
2 2 ( ) ( ) 0G G W S W Sβ γ α γ− + + + − + > , we have the bigger root 2 1r >
 
while the smaller 
root  1r δ<  which indicates 
B
c
x
δ
∂
∂
 is negative in ( ,1)δ . 
Lemma 2 If 0FSρ > , 0G > , and 0W S+ >  as implied by Fundamental Model 
Assumption 4, Technical Assumptions 2 and 3, then 
B
c
x
δ
∂
∂
 is negative in ( ,1)δ
 
when 
2 2 ( ) ( ) 0G G W S W Sβ γ α γ− + + + − + < .  
Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we are able to obtain that when 
2 2 ( ) ( ) 0G G W S W Sβ γ α γ− + + + − + < , the bigger root 1r δ<  which indicates 
B
c
x
δ
∂
∂
 is 
negative in ( ,1)δ . 
Lemma 3 If 0FSρ > , 0G > , and 0W S+ >  as implied by Fundamental Model 
Assumption 4, Technical Assumptions 2 and 3, then 
B
c
x
δ
∂
∂
 is negative in ( ,1)δ
 
when 
2 2 ( ) ( ) 0G G W S W Sβ γ α γ− + + + − + = .
 
 
The proof outlines are as follows: 
When 2 2 ( ) ( ) 0G G W S W Sβ γ α γ− + + + − + = , we have
[ ]
22 2
4 2 2( ) 2 ( )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
B
c
G G W S G W Sx
R
β γ α δ β α
δ δ α δ δ β δ γ
− − + − + +∂
=
∂  − + − + 
 
Since the numerator is a linear function, we can obtain the trend of it by examining 
the boundary of δ δ=
 
and 1. 
a. at δ δ=  
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[ ][ ]
[ ]
22 2
2
22 2
4 2 2( ) 2 ( )
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∂  − + − + 
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=
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From the equality we have 2 ( )GW S γ β
γ α
−
+ =
−
. Substituting W S+  with 2 ( )G γ β
γ α
−
−
 
we have the numerator as [ ]
2 22 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
G α γ β β γ α γ β αγ β
γ α
− − + − − − −
−
. 
Since 0γ α− >  and 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0α γ β β γ α γ β− − + − − − < , we have 0
B
c
x
δ δδ =
∂
<
∂
. 
b. at 1δ =  
[ ]
1 22 2
22 2
4 2 2( ) 2 ( )
(1 ) 2 (1 )
2 2 ( ) 0
(1 ) 2 (1 )
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G G W S G W Sx
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R
δ
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δ δ α δ δ β δ γ
β γ α
δ α δ δ β δ γ
=
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Therefore, when 2 2 ( ) ( ) 0G G W S W Sβ γ α γ− + + + − + = , 0
B
cx
δ
∂
<
∂
 for ( ,1)δ . 
Hereby we proved the statement ii of Proposition 1. Statement iii and iv can also be 
proved in similar approaches.
 
A.2 Verification of Proposition 2 
The proof of Proposition 2 is briefly outlined as follows:  
By observation we know the necessary and sufficient condition for the four 
inequalities to hold is 1(1 ) 0Sδ β δσ− + > .                                                                                                                     
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We note that we already have the condition under which is problem is binding 
optimal that S Sσ σ≥ , thus when S Sσ σ≥ , 
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
1
1
2 2
1 1
2 2 2
1 1 1
(1 )
(1 )
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 4 (1 ) ( )
2
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 4 (1 ) ( )( )
2
S
S
G W S G W S G W S
G
G W S G W S G W S
G
δ β δσ
δ β δσ
δ δ β δ δ β δ δ α
δ δ β δ δ β δ δ α β
− +
≥ − +
− + + + − − + + − +
=
− + + + − + + + − + −
=
 
Recall that 21( ) 0α β− > , we have the formula above greater than zero, i.e., 
1(1 ) 0Sδ β δσ− + > . Therefore, 1(1 ) 0Sδ β δσ− + >
 
when S Sσ σ> .
 
A.3 Verification of Proposition 3 
The proof of Proposition 3 is briefly outlined as follows:  
By observation we know we need to examine the property of 1 2(1 ) Fδ α σ δβ− + , 
which is the determinant of the derivatives’ properties. The sign of the derivation will be the 
opposite as that of 1 2(1 ) Fδ α σ δβ− + .                                                                                                                      
Since the determinant expression is a linear function, we can obtain the sign of the 
determinant by checking the zero point and Fσ . 
1 2 0 2(1 ) 0FF σδ α σ δβ δβ=− + = <  
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
1 2
2 2
2 2 1
2 2 2
2 2 1 2
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(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 4 (1 ) ( )
2( )
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F FF
G W S G W S G W S
W S
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W S
σ σδ α σ δβ
δ δ β δ δ β δ δ α γ
δ δ β δ δ β δ δ α γ β
=
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=
+
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=
+
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Recall that 21 2( ) 0α γ β− > , we have 1 2(1 ) 0F FF σ σδ α σ δβ =− + > . Thus we know 
1 2(1 ) Fδ α σ δβ− +
 
will be first negative and then positive in (0, )Fσ , which indicates that
B
c
F
x
σ
∂
∂
, 
B
w
F
x
σ
∂
∂
, 
B
F
x
σ
∂
∂
, and 
B
F
U
σ
∂
∂
 will first be positive and then negative when 0 F Fσ σ< < . 
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